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Legal rules facilitate as well as constrain human freedom.
H.L.A. Hart captures the difference between these two func-
tions of law by distinguishing between primary and secondary
rules.' Primary rules impose obligations and thereby constrain
behavior. Secondary rules empower individuals to create rela-
tions that confer rights and impose duties. 2 Thus, the criminal
law constrains individual liberty; the law of contracts enhances
it.
Within this framework, the foundation of contracting is mu-
tual agreement. Contractual duties are self-imposed. They are
consequences of individuals authoritatively exercising their au-
tonomy under private enabling rules. Coercive civil authority is
justifiably employed to enforce contractual obligations because
the parties have agreed so to constrain themselves. Of course,
even if the parties to a contract agree to bind themselves to one
another, it does not follow that they have agreed thereby to
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1. H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT oF LAW (1961).
2. Hart is not always consistent in drawing the distinction. He characterizes secon-
dary rules as power conferring. Some confer power on private individuals, others au-
thorize officials. Unfortunately, the rule of recognition, which for Hart is the signature
of a legal system, is a secondary rule, bur it confers power on no one.
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have their obligations to one another enforced by the state (or
by any other third party).'
A. The Default Rule
On the assumption that contracting parties are narrowly ra-
tional and fully informed, a contract between them that fore-
sees and responds to all possible contingencies would be
efficient, or Pareto optimal. That is the definition of a fully
specified contract. Because a fully specified contract is efficient,
it puts the parties to it in a position where neither can improve
his or her lot except at the other's expense. A fully specified
contract is also an equilibrium, that is, it is self-enforcing in the
sense that no party has an incentive unilaterally to defect from
its terms.
Although imagining problems in contract. design and execu-
tion and devising adequate safeguards against all possible
sources of contract failure is a logical possibility, it remains (for
everyone but the Gods) a practical impossibility. Even were it
practically possible, fully specifying a contract might be irra-
tional in that the expected costs of a more complete specifica-
tion may exceed the expected gains from nailing down a
particular solution to an imaginable, but unlikely, possibility.
Unlikely events are not impossible, however. Contingencies
arise with which the contractors have not explicitly dealt. Such
is the stuff of contracts casebooks. When contingencies arise
for which no adequate provisions have been made ex ante, the
parties may disagree about their respective rights and duties ex
post. Sometimes they are able to resolve the conflict privately.
If they are unable to resolve the conflict privately, however, the
3. Randy Barnett (and much black letter law) holds a different view. For him, to
contract is to commit oneself to an enforcement mechanism. This view presupposes a
conception of contract embedded within legal or other institutions, including those
with the authority and power to enforce contractual terms. See Barnett, The Consent The.
ory of Contract, 86 CoLuM. L. Ray. 269 (1986). We can distinguish between two senses of
"contract." The first is the legal one in which to contract is to commit oneself to a
coercively enforceable set of rights and responsibilities. The other is the ordinary lan-
gage or nontechnical sense in which legal enforcement is not presupposed. Our goal
here is to understand the legal practice of contracting. To do so, we believe it is helpful
to explain the roles of courts in enforcing agreements by asking under what conditions,
if any, rational parties would call upon third parties, including courts, to facilitate or to
enforce agreements between them. This approach presupposes that we can imagine
circumstances of contracting without law. Thus we take the ordinary sense of con-
tracting as basic and the legal or juridical one as derivative. We explain the latter in
terms of failures of private contracting, as we define that term later in this article.
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parties may find themselves in court. What rights and responsi-
bilities can a judge, legitimately exercising his or her authority,
impose upon them ex post?
It is often suggested that a judge should apply the following
general rule: confer those rights and impose those dudes to
which the parties would have agreed ex ante.4 Thus, when
transaction costs make an explicit agreement too costly ex ante,
the court should apply a default rule that "mimics" the outcome
of a hypothetical contract between them.- The hypothetical
contract is the one the parties would have made had transac-
tion costs not made their doing so irrational.
As a default rule, the ex ante contract raises two distinct
kinds of issues. The first concerns the content of the rule. How
are we to model or to understand the ex ante contract? The
second concerns the justification a court might have for impos-
ing upon litigating parties the rights and responsibilities im-
plied by the ex ante contract. The problem of justification is
complicated by the fact that the parties are being held in con-
tract to terms to which they did not explicitly agree. Given the
ex post nature of the obligations and rights it distributes, is
there any reason to think that one default rule is any more justi-
fiable than another? Is there, in particular, a case to be made
for the ex ante contract as the default rule?
B. Consent and the Default Rule
One approach to the problem ofjustifying a default rule is to
connect it to a general theory of contractual obligation. What
kind of argument might the theory of contractual obligation
suggested by Hart's notion of a private empowering rule-that
is, a consent theory-offer? What, in other words, is the rele-
vant connection between explicit consent and hypothetical ex
ante contracting?'
We can distinguish between at least two kinds of arguments a
consent theorist might advance to support the claim that an ex
ante hypothetical contract is a uniquely appropriate way to es-
4. See Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE
LJ. 353 (1988), in which the tort problem of specifying the conditions of liability for
defective product is recast as a contracts problem: that is, the terms of liability should
be those the parties would have agreed to ex ante.
5. This is, of course, not the only default rule a judge can apply. In the alternative, a
court might assign rights and responsibilities according to a principle of social justice,
wealth redistribution or insurance.
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tablish ex post the terms of incompletely specified contracts.
The first argument relies on thejustificatory force of hypotheti-
cal consent. Roughly, the argument is as follows: the claims the
parties have explicitly imposed upon one another are legiti-
mately enforced against the parties because they have actually
consented to those terms. The default rule imposes rights and
responsibilities to which the parties would have consented. To
the same extent and in the same way that consent justifies a
court imposing the rights and responsibilities made explicit in a
contract, hypothetical consent justifies imposing the rights and
responsibilities that are implied by the application of the de-
fault rule. Is the argument persuasive?
In the case of explicit consent, we recognize a difference be-
tween unfree acts and irrational ones. A person may consent to
conduct detrimental to his interests (irrational, but free), or he
may be compelled against his will to promote his interests (ra-
tional, but unfree-as in some forms of paternalism). The dis-
tinction between consent and rational self-interest becomes
murkier in arguments attempting to establish the terms to
which a particular person conceived of in a particular way would
have consented. An example drawn from the economic analysis
of law nicely illustrates this problem in arguments from hypo-
thetical consent and the additional, more fundamental problem
of justifying the imposition of duties ex post on the grounds
that they would have been agreed to ex ante.
Economists evaluate allocations of resources and states of
the world by the criterion of efficiency. From the moral point of
view, is the efficiency of an allocation or of a social state a desir-
able property of it? In effect, this question is an invitation to
consider the normative underpinnings of economic analysis.
Moral arguments in favor of efficiency are of two sorts: utilita-
rian and consensual.6 Only the latter concerns us here.
Economists distinguish among three criteria of economic ef-
ficiency: Pareto superiority, Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. S' is Pareto superior to S' if and only if no one prefers
So to S' and at least one person prefers S' to S' . S is Pareto
optimal if and only if there exists no Si Pareto superior to it. S' is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient to S' if and only if S' is potentially Pareto
superior to So. S1 is potentially Pareto superior to So if in going
6. SeeJ. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95-132 (1988).
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from SO to S' resources could be arranged so that no one pre-
fers So to S' and at least one person prefers S' to S' . Because
the other efficiency concepts are defined in terms of Pareto su-
periority, we might ask what the relationship between it and
consent could be. The consensual defense of Pareto superiority
is very simple, and although it has been employed primarily by
Richard Posner in his defense of efficiency, the argument has
its roots in Nicholas Kaldor's work some fifty years earlier.'
The argument is as follows:
(1) S' is Pareto superior to S' if and only if no one prefers
So to S' and at least one prefers S1 over So.
(2) Therefore, each person would consent to S', that is,
would choose S' over So.
Some Pareto improvements like rational, voluntary market
transactions are in fact consented to, though it remains a fur-
ther question whether typical market transactions are morally
defensible because they are Pareto improving or because they
have been voluntarily consummated. In any case, many Pareto
improvements are not consented to by every person affected.
Take the famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.8 In
this case, a dock owner refused to allow a ship to remain
docked beyond the period of time set forth by the terms of a
contract between the dock owner and the ship's captain, and
ordered it to leave. The captain refused to set his ship free be-
cause it would very likely have been lost at sea, a victim of an
impending storm. The ship remained docked, the storm came,
and the ship repeatedly smashed the dock, resulting in $500
damages to the dock. The court held that even 'though the
ship's captain acted correctly in firmly tying the boat to the
dock, he was required to compensate the dock owner. If the
ship's captain acted rationally, he was better off taking the risk
and compensating the dock owner ex post than he would have
been had he set the ship to sea. Provided the dock owner was
fully compensated for whatever damages resulted from the ship
captain's decision, the dockowner should be indifferent be-
tween what actually occurred and what would have occurred
had the captain set his ship afloat. Thus, the outcome of the
case constitutes a Pareto improvement, but not one to which all
the relevant parties consented. In fact, the dock owner made
7. For a discussion of the argument, see id at 115-29.
8. 100 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
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every effort to express his unwillingness to agree to the cap-
tain's decision. Here we have a Pareto improvement that could
not be justified on the grounds of consent.9
So the consent argument for the legal rule must be that ex
ante the parties seeking to maximize overall wealth or utility
would have consented to it, not that they actually did consent. The
premise in that argument is simply the one stated above: all the
relevant parties are made better off by the Pareto improving
state (or at least are made no worse off by it). Thus, they prefer
the Pareto improving state to the Pareto inferior one (Premise
One). To say that they prefer one state to the other is to say
that under normal conditions they would choose the former to
the latter (Conclusion): thus we have the connection of Pareto
superiority to hypothetical consent. The premise in the argu-
ment expresses the individual rationality of the proposed
change; the conclusion expresses the parties' hypothetical con-
sent to it. From the fact that a social state makes someone no
worse off (that is, it is not irrational for him), we are to infer
that the agent would have consented to it. Consent follows as a
matter of logic from considerations of rationality.
Consequently, the concept of hypothetical consent expresses
nothing that is not already captured in the idea of rational self-
interest. The distinction between consent and rationality cen-
tral to moral theory apparently evaporates. The claim that im-
posing obligations ex post'is justified because the parties would
have consented to them ex ante adds nothing to a defense of
such a proposal that is not already expressed by the argument
that imposing obligations ex post is justified whenever such ob-
ligations would have been rational for the parties ex ante. Thus,
the reliance on ex ante rational bargaining provides a rational-
ity or welfarist defense of the default rule, not a consensualist
one.
A consent theorist needs another way of connecting hypo-
9. Posner has argued that by accepting compensation ex post, one gives consent, set
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HoEsTRA L. REv. 487,491 (1980), which in this case means that in spite of his protesta-
tions to the contrary, the dock owner consented to the captain's decision by accepting
compensation. Surely this is seriously confused; first, because often people demand
compensation not to give their consent to being harmed, but as redress for a wrong done
to them; second, because if to accept compensation is to give consent, then the only
way not to consent is to refuse compensation, which, of course, would ordinarily count
as giving consent. The argument that compensation constitutes consent has things abso-
lutely backwards.
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thetical rational bargaining to hypothetical consent, a way that
maintains both the analytic distinction between the two and the
significance of both to a full consensual defense of-contractual
obligation. One approach could rely on the claim that the rela-
tionship between hypothetical rational bargaining and hypo-
thetical consent is epistemic, not analytic. What it would have
been rational for the parties to bargain for ex ante is not
equivalent to what they would have agreed to, nor does it for-
mally imply their agreement. It is, nevertheless, evidence, per-
haps the best evidence, of what the parties would have agreed
to ex ante. Rather than trying to derive hypothetical consent
from rationality, the suggestion is that the former provides pre-
sumptive evidence of the latter. In the absence of contradictory
evidence, that is, evidence contrary to that derived from the hy-
pothetical rational bargain, it is legitimate to infer that the par-
ties would have consented to that which would have been the
outcome of a rational bargain between them.
The consent theorist's first strategy for defending the ex ante
contract as a default rule, then, ultimately rests on the fact that
what would have been rational for the parties ex ante is ex-
tremely strong evidence of the terms to which they would have
agreed. What the parties would have agreed to ex ante in turn
provides some justification for holding them to the terms ex
post. This line of defense is, of course, incomplete pending an
account of why it is that something to which individuals would
have agreed (though they did not in fact) provides a civil au-
thority with grounds for imposing those conditions upon them
now (when they quite explicitly do not agree to those
conditions).
The second line of defense open to the consent theorist is
designed to obviate this last problem. In this view, by the very
act of contracting the patties consent not only to a framework
of explicitly created rights and duties, but to a jurisdiction for
resolving conflicts that might arise in construing those rights
and duties. Should the occasion. arise, the jurisdiction to which
the parties consent is authorized to impose rights and duties ex
post that were not made explicit ex ante. To contract is, among
other things, to consent to the relevant default provisions of
the law. Thus, the rights and responsibilities allocated by a de-
fault rule ex post are, in a suitable sense, consented to ex ante.
This line of argument eliminates the need to demonstrate
No. 3] 645
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either that the terms imposed by the default rule would have
been consented to by the parties, or that what the parties would
have consented to ex ante provides a reason for imposing those
terms upon them now. The importance of hypothetical consent
simply disappears, and with it the need to establish an eviden-
tiary or analytic connection between it and the ex ante rational
bargain.
This approach appears to obviate two problems- specifying
the relationship (analytic or epistemic) between rational bar-
gaining and hypothetical consent, and arguing for the norma-
tive punch of the latter-but at the expense of creating others.
The problem is that if this line of argument constitutes a sound
consensual defense of the ex ante contract default rule, it also
constitutes an equivalently good defense of all default rules,
For if by consenting to a contract, one consents to a jurisdic-
tion's default rule, then one consents to whatever rule the court
applies-from those rules aimed at reconstructing a hypotheti-
cal bargain to those imposing fair terms, to others imposing
efficient terms, to those imposing obnoxious terms, and so on.
This reconstruction of the consent theory of contractual obliga-
tion, in other words, provides no sense in which the ex ante
rational contract is special. If the ex ante rational bargain as a
default rule has a special attraction for this sort of consent the-
orist, it cannot be, strictly speaking, a matter of consent.
If this argument works at all, it works too well. The next
question is whether it works at all. It makes sense to say that
two contracting parties consent to the obligations and rights
their contract specifies to the extent each has alternative oppor-
tunities, or at least provided that none of the contractual terms
are imposed unwillingly upon either of them. It follows, then,
that the parties could be said to consent to a relevant author-
ity's default rule only if they willingly, that is, noncoercively,
choose it. This is not typically the case, however. The default
rule of any jurisdiction is generally a non-negotiable part of
their bargain. For that reason, it is questionable whether by
consenting to a framework of contractual rights and responsi-
bilities, the parties consent to the application of the operative
default rule.
It is no counterargument that the parties could reduce the
extent to which they rely upon the default rule. Although it is
true that the parties could more fully specify their contract and
646 [Vol. 12
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thereby reduce the scope of the rule's application, this shows
only that the parties can agree to reduce or to minimize the
rule's impact, not that in doing so they consent to the rule's use
in the areas they do not contract around.
To feel comfortable with the claim that by contracting parties
consent to the relevant default rule, we would have to assume
something like a competitive market in authoritative jurisdic-
tions. Then, the parties would choose jurisdictions based,
among other things, on the default rule in effect.
If the consent theorist's claim is that a default rule is justified
to the extent that it would be freely chosen in a competitive
market for authoritative jurisdictions, then he too ends up rely-
ing upon arguments from hypothetical, not explicit consent.
Moreover, the argument the consent theorist would very likely
employ to defend the ex ante contract as a default rule would
be that among all the possible rules, it is the one that is rational
for the parties ex ante. In other words, the ex ante contract is
individually and collectively rational and, for those reasons,
would have been chosen by rational parties free to pick among
alternative default rules. The rationality of the default rule fol-
lows from the fact that it reduces the costs of contracting. It
enables each party to avoid the costs under other rules of con-
tracting out, of ever more fully specifying their contract. Once
again, the argument for the ex ante contract ultimately relies
on hypothetical consent and a relationship, analytic or episte-
mic, between what is rational for someone ex ante and what
that person would have consented to ex ante. The effort to re-
place hypothetical with explicit consent does not, in the end,
avoid these problems.
-In effect we can characterize a kind of research program for a
consent theorist bent on defending the ex ante contract as a
uniquely appropriate default rule. The program has three com-
ponents. The first is to specify rigorously the content of the
hypothetical rational bargain between the parties. The second
is to determine what sort of evidence, if any, exists about what
the parties would have agreed to that could ever contradict the
evidence supplied by the hypothetical rational bargain. The
third problem we have already mentioned. Even if we can spec-
ify rigorously the content of hypothetical rational bargains en-
visaged by the default rule, and can determine successfully in
individual cases (or in general) the reliability of this informa-
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tion for demonstrating what the parties would in fact have
agreed to, it is a further question whether what they would have
consented to provides a court with sufficient justification for
imposing those terms upon them, let alone whether it provides
the same sort of'justification their actual consent would.
C. Rationality and the Default Rule
One problem that keeps emerging when we try to develop a
hypothetical consent defense of the default rule is that the best
evidence we have of what the parties would have agreed to is
that to which it would have been rational for them to agree. We
are left then to draw inferences from the latter to the former on
the apparent assumption that, as between the two, only the for-
mer-what the parties would have consented to-provides a
justification for allocating rights and responsibilities. Perhaps
that assumption is unwarranted; perhaps considerations of ra-
tionality have justificatory force on their own. In that case, one
could more straightforwardly defend the ex ante contract not
on the grounds that parties in fact agree to it or would have
agreed to the allocation of rights and responsibilities it sets out,
but on the grounds that it or the rights and responsibilities it
imposes are rational.
In this approach rationality, not consent, is the basis of con-
tractual obligation and the foundation of legitimate third party
enforcement. Thus, the justification for applying the default
rule is not that it constitutes or is presumptive evidence of the
parties' consent, but that, when made rigorous, it specifies
rights and obligations that are rational for the parties. Such
rights and responsibilities, because they are rational, are justifi-
ably imposed on the parties.
This approach, which can also be characterized as a research
program, also raises three kinds of problems. First, like the
consent theory, the rationality theory must specify rigorously
the content of the hypothetical rational bargain between the
parties. Second, while the consent theory has an intuitively
plausible theory of enforceable claims made explicit in con-
tracts, it lacks a plausible theory of the default rule. That is, it
takes consent as justificationally basic and is left to explain the
relevance of rationality to consent. In contrast, the rationality
theory has a plausible interpretation of the default rule: that is,
the default rule provides a specification of the terms to which it
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would be rational for the parties to have agreed. It must now
give a plausible account of the role of actual consent, when
such consent is present. In other words, because the rationality
theory takes principles of rationality as justificationally basic, it
gives an immediate explanation of the relevance of the default
rule. It is left, however, with the task of explaining the signifi-
cance of explicit consent in contract. If rationality carries the
moral weight, what significance does consent have? Third, the
rationality theory must show why rationality binds. We take it
for granted that a state of affairs to which individuals volunta-
rily agree is, ceteris paribus, morally unobjectionable. But it is
not obvious how the moral defensibility of a state of the world
can be said to follow from its rationality.
In the rationality view, the relationship between rationality
and actual consent cainot be one of entailment. Just as it does
not follow logically that people agree to what is in their inter-
ests, it cannot follow logically that what they agree to is rational
for them. Thus, in the rationality theory, actual consent, when
present, does not justify; rather it provides evidence, again per-
haps the best evidence, of what is rational for the parties. There
is an interesting analogy in the relationship of consent to ra-
tional bargaining in the consent and rationality theories of con-
tractual obligation. In the consent theory, rationality provides
evidence of consent. In the rationality theory, consent provides
evidence of rationality. Both theories also face justificatory ob-
stacles. The consent theory may explain how consent justifies,
but its adherence to the default rule requires it to explain how
hypothetical consent justifies. Similarly, the rationality theory
explains the relevance of the default rule, but it needs to ex-
plain the moral relevance of rationality.
Common to both strategies, moreover, is the problem of
specifying the content of the default rule. The difference be-
tween them is the normative use to which the model is put. In
the consent theory, the model of the "ex ante bargain" pro-
vides evidence of the terms to which the parties would have
consented. In the rationality theory, it specifies what in a partic-
ular case, is rational, and, given appropriate premises connect-
ing rationality to morality, what morally can be required of the
parties.
What we have done so far is sketch out two research pro-
grams. Both rely on the ex ante bargain as a default rule, but
No. 3] 649
HeinOnline  -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  649 1989
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
which gives a better justification of the legitimacy of a court's
applying that rule? In this article we do not intend to adjudicate
this dispute in the normative theory of contract. Our aims here
are in a sense both more modest and more ambitious. We in-
tend to take seriously the concept of the ex ante bargain and
give it some flesh. We want to take appeals to the rational bar-
gain that until now have been more abstract than concrete and
give them some structure and rigor. It is not our concern here
whether in doing so we advance the cause of any particular the-
ory of contractual obligation. Our goal is to make a contribu-
tion to contract theory more generally: for without a
specification of the parameters and structure of the rational
bargain, appeals to it, however attractive in theory, will be
empty in practice. Thus, we intend to give a full and rigorous
characterization of rational bargaining in a way that will shed
considerable light on both the analytic and the normative ques-
tions of contractual obligation. In the course of our presenta-
tion of this analytic structure, we attempt to explain how a
central doctrine of contract law-disclosure--can be usefully il-
luminated by conceiving of the process of contracting as a
scheme of rational bargaining.
If the idea of the contract as a rational bargain is ultimately
unpersuasive, or if our efforts to illuminate some contract doc-
trines in rational choice terms is unconvincing, we nevertheless
would have provided a way of giving content to the default
rule: a way that is both rigorous and rich. For the idea of a
rational bargain is a complex one, far more complex and diffi-
cult to apply than either contract theorists or judges have until
now grasped.
II. THE RATIONAL CoNTRAcT
A. Bargaining and Contract: Introduction
We begin by looking at how two parties engage in a contrac-
tual transaction, how they secure a rational bargain, without law.
Our analysis benefits from recent formal literature on bargain-
ing under both complete and imperfect information, part of the
theory of cooperative games. It looks at how people resolve
disputes involving elements of both conflict and cooperation.
We depict contracting as a divisible prisoners dilemma game.
Here, the parties secure no contract unless they agree on a way
650 [Vol. 12
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of enforcing their agreement and of distributing any potential
gains. The conditions under which they invoke third-party par-
ticipation, including judicial or legislative intervention, and the
form of that participation, depend on the costs of consummat-
ing the deal. Those costs derive from the inherent risks associ-
ated with imperfect information concerning the parties'
transaction and the resources they devote to minimizing those
risks. In sum, we look at contract law in light of what we know
about bargaining, rather than vice versa. That is, although we
think analytic study of bargaining "in the shadow of the law"' 0
is important and useful, the theory of rational bargaining in the
absence of law has a claim to analytic priority. It is that claim we
mean to stake.
Anyone familiar with the literature on rational bargaining
knows that there are different solutions to the bargaining prob-
lem, different ways of spelling out the distribution to which ra-
tional parties will agree. We employ a form of the theory that
relies on the idea of bargaining as consisting of making claims
and rational concessions from those claims. We call this con-
cession theory." Our purpose in doing so is not to establish
that the specific distributions the concession theory predicts
are superior to the distributions predicted by competing theo-
ries. Rather, concession theory captures important features of
the way people go about bargaining, synthesizes unique fea-
tures in the other theories, and adopts assumptions common to
all. Therefore, it has a lot to say about the rules people would
adopt ex ante to encourage contracting.
A bargaining theoretic approach to contract law has four fea-
tures that recommend it over competing approaches. First, the
bargaining approach admits reward-triggering norms as a basis
for social control. Typically, economic and sociological theo-
ries, especially those based solely on the prisoners dilemma
logic, depend on negative reinforcements to induce compliance
with norms.' 2 But according to bargaining theory, although
one might sanction someone for failing to offer concessions or
for violating an agreed upon division, the idea is to reward and
10. See Mnookin & Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979).
11. See D. GAuTHIER, MoRALs By AGp EMENr (1986); Heckathorn, A Unified Model for
Bargaining and Conflict, 25 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 261 (1980).
12. See Ellickson, Of Coast and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County,
38 STAN. L REv. 623 (1986).
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to encourage concession-making so as to secure cooperation.
We can ask whether legal doctrines do that, and if so, in what
ways.
Second, a bargaining theoretic approach takes explicit ac-
count of fairness as a part of contractual exchange. If people
worry about fairness and if in every theory of ratibnal con-
tracting the parties ineluctably confront fairness concerns, then
when and how do the courts take account of it? In fact and in
theory, fairness matters. Under what conditions, then, will ra-
tional contractors require courts to act on that concern-and in
what capacities?
Our approach shares with law-and-economics the impor-
tance of -efficiency. It differs from many forms of economic
analysis in virtue of bargaining theory's emphasis upon the di-
vision or fairness problem. Our approach shares with the law-
and-society tradition, the importance of context. Rational deci-
sion-making is necessarily sensitive to the context of the deci-
sion. The status quo is relevant; contracting always occurs
within a pre-existing web of continuing, contractual relation-
ships. The resources parties bring into bargaining are relevant.
And the uncertainties peculiar to different contexts are
relevant.
Our approach shares with moral theories the importance of
fairness and justice to the legitimacy of civil authority. How-
ever, unlike other theories, it appeals to criteria of fairness or
justice endogenous to transaction relationships. It does not
view contracting as necessarily constrained by external stan-
dards of fairness; rather it views the process of rational con-
tracting as, in part, specifying the relevant conception of
fairness.
Third, bargaining theory takes a unified view of contracting.
It dispels the illusion that contract law doctrines are independ-
ent of one another. For example, legal scholarship and judicial
decisions present damage measures, disclosure rules, and un-
conscionability as if they have nothing to do with each other.
That is wrong. People will have difficulty reaching an agree-
ment not only if they fear it may become uneconomic, which is
relevant to establishing damage measures, but also if they fear
it might become unfair, which is relevant to recision because of
unconscionability. Their estimates of these fears depend in part
on their investments in information, including the representa-
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tions they make to each other, which in turn bears on the ap-
propriateness of disclosure rules.
Fourth, analyzing the process of rational bargaining in the
absence of law yields insight into the varying role of the court
in contracts, specifically, into the conditions under which peo-
ple turn to courts, and the defensibility of various contract law
doctrines that have emerged in response. Like any other device
to safeguard bargains, the court mitigates some of the risks of
contracting better than others, but it is imperfect and costly. It
can be more efficacious than alternative devices. People choos-
ing among devices aim to minimize the sum of the costs of un-
certainty and of safeguarding against it. Specialized doctrines
in law emerge when rational bargainers charge the courts with
effecting that policy.
B. Three Problems in Contracting
The terms of an agreement to cooperate among two or more
people, their contract, stipulates (1) specific actions by each to
be carried out at some time in the future, and (2) rewards and
penalties to be meted out following compliance or defection.
These terms constitute safeguards crafted to minimize and allo-
cate risk, but in doing so the terms create risks of their own.
What are the conditions under which rational actors will agree
to cooperate if charged explicitly with designing a policy to
cope with risk and uncertainty in their environment?
The decision-making calculus that rational actors use in
crafting a contract is relatively complex because it requires
resolving three distinct but intertwined problems: (1) coordina-
tion, (2) division, and (3) defection. These problems are cap-
tured in a type of game termed the divisible prisoner's
dilemma. While other types of games (for example, pure coor-
dination or division games, prisoner's dilemmas) typically iso-
late one feature of rational decision that can come into play in
contracting,13 this game describes three such features, the inter-
action between those features, and their informational
requirements.
The divisible prisoner's dilemma involves three principles of
rationality: (1) rational cooperation, (2) rational division, and
13. See Landa & Grofman, Games of Breach and the Role of Contract Law in Protecting the
Expectation Interest, in 3 REsEARcu IN LAw AND EcONoMics 67 (R. Zerbe ed. 1981).
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(3) rational compliance. Failure to satisfy any one of the three
demands of rationality leads to-contract failure; satisfying all
three is necessary and sufficient for agreement and perform-
ance on a contract.
An example of the divisible prisoner's dilemma is depicted in
matrix (normal) form in Figure One. For the moment, assume
Figure 1: Divisible Prisoner's Dilemma
Player B
Performance




that each player knows both payoffs in all of the cells. Player A
(row) and player B (column) each make a three-dimensional
choice. Each must decide whether to contract or not; and if the
choice is to contract, whether to seek and honor contract one
or contract two. In making this decision each of three problems
of rational contracting emerges.
The coordination problem is resolved by whether or not the par-
ties share a common interest in contracting over acting individ-
ually. To motivate acting in concert, they must identify feasible
gains that would otherwise be unobtainable. In our example,
the two contracts represented by cells one and five represent
Contract 1  Status quo B free ides
19,7 9,2 3,11
C1  D NPb
Status quo Contract 2  B free rides
9,2 16,10 3,11
D C2  NPb
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higher payoffs for both parties than do the noncontract alterna-
tives. Thus, we would expect the players to solve their coordi-
nation problem. Doing so is not sufficient for contracting,
however, for two problems remain. A division problem arises if
player A prefers contract one to contract two whereas player B
has the opposite preference. Consequently, opposed prefer-
ences regarding how to contract complicate the common pref-
erence for a contract over no contract. -A defection problem arises
if a player gains from unilaterally defecting from a contract
once agreement is secured.
The defection problem is illustrated powerfully in the
nondivisible or standard prisoner's dilemma in which the domi-
nant strategy for each player is to defect from whatever agree-
ments he or she has made. In our example, A gains by defecting
to cell seven or eight, -and B gains by defecting to cell three or
six.
C. Phases in Contracting
Each problem in the contractual relationship corresponds to
a distinct phase of the contracting process and involves a dis-
tinct principle of rationality. 4 First, in thepre-phase the decision
whether to coordinate, that is, whether to seek a contract, is
made. If the parties are rational, each predicates an affirmative
decision on expectations that joint gains will be attainable
under the contract. Second, in the negotiation phase the decision
of how to contract is made. That is, the parties agree upon the
terms of the contract, specifying the manner in which the gains
resulting from the contract and the burdens of enforcing it are
to be allocated. Finally, in the post-phase each party makes the
decision to fulfill or to violate the contract and monitors the
compliance of others.
Each phase contains a potential pitfall. That is, individuals
may fail to contract because (1) one or more of the essential
parties prefers to act independently rather than to seek a con-
tract, (2) the parties fail to agree upon the terms of the con-
tract, or (3) the contract collapses owing to a violation of its
14. For the sake of the exposition, we treat each phase in temporal progression and
as distinct from the others. In fact, a rational bargainer may treat concerns arising in
different phases of the process at the same time or in the reverse order we suggest.
Ours is an analytic device, in which the phases of contracting progress in logical space-
time.
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terms. Each phase is distinct not only in the sense of carrying
its own pitfalls to contracting; to succeed at each phase, a con-
tract must meet the demands of distinct but ultimately related
rationality conditions. The phases of contracting and their re-
spective rationality conditions are developed below.
1. Pre-phase: Joint Rationality
No one can expect another person to engage in contracting
unless each perceives an opportunity for mutual gain. That
surely is the operating assumption when a buyer responds to a
seller's "for sale" notice and when labor negotiates with man-
agement. Indeed, it is such a commonplace that we tend to take
it for granted, overlooking its analytical importance.
We can put this obvious fact about contracting in an analyti-
cally precise way. A necessary condition for agreeing to a con-
tract is that its expected outcome satisfies what may be termed
the joint rationality condition. If U is the utility that individual i
expects to secure in contracting; Di is i's utility from disagree-
ment (that is, the status quo); U = (Ua,Ub) is a given agree-
ment's utility vector; and U' = (U'a,U'b) is any other feasible
agreement's utility vector, U is jointly rational if for each feasi-
ble outcome U',
U2 > U'., or Ub > U'b. (1)
The joint rationality condition can be clarified by analyzing
Figure Two below.
C 1, C2 represents the contract curve, that is, the set of Pareto
optimal outcomes to the northeast of D. D, in turn, represents
the disagreement point, the outcome that results if the parties
fail to reach agreement. NP. and NPb are the non-performance
outcomes. NP2 results when A and B reach agreement with
which B complies and from which.A defects. NPb represents the
outcome that results when A complies and B defects. These are
the free-rider outcomes. Both are Pareto optimal in the sense
that no points lie to their northeast in the utility-space repre-
sentation of the game. Though Pareto optimal, they are not
Pareto superior to D, and thus, they do not lie on the contract
curve C1, C2. NPa, NPb, and all the points on the contract curve
C1, C2 are jointly rational or Pareto optimal. Only points on the
contract curve, however, are Pareto optimal and Pareto supe-
rior to D.
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If information is imperfect or incomplete, each party has an
incentive to expend resources to inquire whether a bargain
with someone else promises to be advantageous. These re-
sources are transaction resources. At the coordination or pre-
phase, parties may expend transaction resources to identify and
secure D at the outset. Everyone wants a referent from which
he can evaluate feasible outcomes. Contracting will breakdown
and may not even begin without it (as is the case in labor-man-
agement negotiations with newly certified unions whose legiti-
macy is uncertain). Similarly, individuals cannot take for
granted the existence of the contract curve, even though op-
portunities for more efficient cooperation tend to exist in every
relationship. If people must expend resources to determine the
location of the disagreement point or the contract curve, some
or all of the gains from contracting are consumed, that is, in
terms of Figure Two, C1, C2 moves toward C3, C4.
The magnitude of the coordination problem measures the
social gains foregone by failing to coordinate. 5 We define the
magnitude of the coordination problem, Mc, as the maximum proportion
of the gains attainable from contracting that a rational contractor in the
system could be motivated to expend on transaction resources to resolve the
coordination problem. This is the ratio of the gain resulting from
15. For an analysis of coordination games, see T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CON-
,ucr 83-118 (1960).
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coordination to the maximum gain attainable from contracting
over not contracting. The former is the difference between the
individual's best hope payoff, Bi, defined as the highest payoff
awarded on the contract curve, and the individual's payoff from
the noncooperative outcome, Ni, that is, the utility awarded in-
dividual i by the outcome (or mix of outcomes) resulting if the
potential contractors act independently rather than jointly. For
example, in Figure One's game if the players sought to contract
but failed to correlate their choices between the two alternative
contracts (that is, each would choose contract. one or two with
equal probability), they would contract only fifty percent of the
time (cells one or five), and end up at the status quo (cells two
or four) the rest of the time. That mixture of outcomes would,
on average, award a utility of NA = 13.25 and NB = 5.25.16 The
difference between the best-hope outcome and the non-
cooperative otucome, Bi - Ni, is the gain attributable to coor-
dination. This is the maximum amount that a rational
contractor could be motivated to expend to resolve the coordi-
nation problem.
Similarly, the maximum gain awarded to the individual as a
result of contracting is the difference between the best-hope
payoff, Bi, and the disagreement payoff, Di, that is, Bi - D,. In
consequence, the magnitude of the coordination problem for
individual i, Mci, is given by the following expression:
Md = (Bi - Ni)/(Bi - D) (2)
For example, in Figure One's system, player A's coordination
problem is Mc. = (19 - 13.25)/(19 - 9) = 0.575, and player
B's problem is Mcb = (10 - 5.25)/(10 -2) = 0.59.
The magnitude of the coordination problem faced by a
group of individuals can be defined as the maximum problem
faced by any of its members, that is,
Mc = Max[Mcj (3)
For example, in Figure One's system, Mc = 0.59. This expres-
sion indicates the maximum proportion of contractual gains
that any rational group member could be motivated to expend
on resolving the coordination problem. This figure is not iden-
16. Alternatively, if the focus of analysis is the problem of coordination in general,
rather than the problem of implementing given a prior decision to contract, the non-
cooperative outcome can be defined as the Nash noncooperative equilibrium. See Nash,
Non-cooperative Games, 54 ANNmALS OF MATHEMATiCS 286-95 (1951).
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tical to actual expenditures to resolve the coordination prob-
lem. According to the principles of transactions-cost
economics, individuals have incentives to minimize their ex-
penditure of transaction resources, so actual expenditures will
tend to fall below that theoretic maximum. Other things equal,
actual expenditures on transaction resources will be positively
related to the magnitude of the coordination problem.
Contracting to secure mutual gains consumes transaction re-
sources that are scarce and costly to obtain. In the old law-and-
economics tradition, transaction costs are assumed to be low in
contracting situations, so that parties are able to gather all per-
tinent information and to assign all relevant risks. 17 Because
the old law-and-economics tradition assumes individuals have
perfect information, are completely rational, and face no im-
pediments to enteringtransactions, "[i]t would be surprising if
such superhumans were not able to manage their own affairs
without the intervention of government."' 8 As it happens,
however, sometimes they are not.
The newer law-and-economics tradition emphasizes transac-
tion costs even in contract (as opposed to "tort" or "stranger")
situations. Because this tradition assumes individuals have im-
perfect information and limited rationality, and encounter sub-
stantial impediments in contracting, it would be surprising if
such patently imperfect individuals were able to manage their
affairs without the intervention of government. As it happens,
in some cases, they do.
This discontinuity between "prohibitive" and "non-prohibi-
tive" transaction costs is, of course, an analytic artifice begging
for elaboration. The private and governmental controls that
people craft depend on the relative size of the transaction costs
involved. Because each of the three decision-making problems
in any relationship involve unique hazards from imperfect in-
formation, the undifferentiated, generic treatment of transac-
tion costs is analytically untenable as well.
17. Just think of the Coase Theorem and the long line of Chicago-style law-and-
economics that sees itself as driven by Coase's insight that when transaction costs are
low, individuals contract around inefficiencies. Thus, we have the identification of con-
tract with low transaction costs. Coase himself did not commit the mistake of identify-
ing contracting with low transaction costs.
18. Farber, Contract Law and Modem Economic Theoy.
, 
78 Nw. U.L. REv. 303, 305
(1983).
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2. The Negotiation Phase: Concession Rationality
Recognizing that contracting would increase efficiency, that
it would generate benefits in excess of costs, is not a sufficient
condition for contracting to occur. 9 Contracting requires that
parties to the negotiations resolve the division problem, either
directly by agreeing upon allocations of benefits and costs, or
indirectly by agreeing upon a set of procedures by which these
allocations are to be determined. The problem is not just the
cost of establishing a set of feasible and acceptable outcomes.
Even if that cost is nil, the strategic nature of the choice may
induce a noncooperative outcome.2 0 Strategy may require play-
ers to disguise their true intentions in pursuit of an agreement,
moderating or exaggerating their demands based on their view
of how each will respond to the other. Thus, failure to resolve
the division problem can complicate the process of contracting
even to the point of defeating it.
Returning to Figure Two, the division problem arises be-
cause the players have opposite preferences regarding where
along the contract curve agreement should occur.2 Expressed
in bargaining theoretic terms, C1, contract one, is player A's
best-hope outcome because it is the outcome that is (i) most pre-
ferred by A, (ii) no worse than disagreement for B, (iii) feasible,
and (iv) enforceable. Similarly, C2, contract two, represents B's
best hope. The players' best hopes correspond to opposite
endpoints of the contract curve. When a concession is defined as
agreeing to an outcome less preferred than one's own best
hope, it is obvious that agreement requires concessions. Either
one player makes all the concessions required for agreement by
assenting to the other's best-hope outcome, or both players
make concessions resulting in agreement at an intermediate
point on the contract curve. If bargaining over the allocation of
concessions fails, so too does contracting.
Intuitively, we recognize the problem of settling on a division
of cooperative gains as endemic in human behavior and know
that people resolve it when the conditions are right. Empirical
19. See McClelland & Rohrbaugh, Who Accepts the Pareto Axiom? The Role of Utility and
Equity in Arbitration Decisions, 23 BEHAVIORAL Smt. 446 (1978).
20. See Coleman, Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule, Soc. PHIL. & PoL'v,
Spring 1985, at 69; Cooter, The Cost ofCoase, IIJ. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).
21. Whereas mixtures between contracts one and two are assumed to be feasible in
this game (hence, the CIC2 line), mixtures between other outcomes of this game are
assumed not to be feasible. We adopt this convention to simplify the analysis.
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studies confirm that standards of "fair division" sometimes
guide rational agreement even in the absence of third-party en-
forcement. In particular, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler have
shown that when unanticipated events induce unanticipated di-
visions, they do not necessarily threaten the economic viability
of an arrangement. 22 In other words, individuals sometimes ap-
peal to a sense of fairness to solve division problems when fail-
ure to reach agreement in division may jeopardize an
opportunity for mutual gain. Laboratory experiments testing
the Coase Theorem demonstrate as well that parties are able to
secure jointly maximizing outcomes, though different methods
of assigning property entitlements influence the division of the
gains.23 Other studies confirm (1) the importance of the status
quo in choices over division rules, and (2) the heavier weight
ascribed to losses than equivalent gains in evaluating out-
comes. 24 In short, empirical studies suggest that players are
often able to solve their division problem and point to some of
the relevant factors in settling on particular divisions: namely,
the allocation of initial entitlements, a sense of fairness, the rel-
ative disparity in weighting equivalent gains and losses, and so
on.
Under a broad range of conditions, then, contracting parties
settle on distributions of the gains from trade, which simply
means that they allocate concessions. They also have in mind
which among the available points on the contract curve they
intend to safeguard by the terms of any contract. Put analytically,
a necessary condition for agreeing to a contract is that its ex-
pected outcomes satisfy what may be termed the principle of
concession rationality.
Each of the formal models in the literature provides a distinct
22. See Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59J.
Bus. 285 (1986).
23. See Hoffinan & Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examina-
tion of Subjects' Concepts of DistributiveJustice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985).
24. See Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Eavey, Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in
Experimental Groups, 31 AM.J. PoL Sc. 606 (1986); Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, Fair-
ness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking. Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728
(1986).
25. Formal theoretic accounts of bargaining have been proposed by economists,
game theorists, social psychologists, and strategic analysts. See J. HARSANVI, RATIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS (1977); A.
ROTH, GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1985); 0. YOUNG, BARGAINING: FOR-
MAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION (1975); Binmore, Rubinstein, & Wolinsky, The Nash
Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986).
No. 3] 661
HeinOnline  -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  661 1989
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
meaning to the concept of concession rationality. No single
point-specific solution to the bargaining problem has gained
universal acceptance. But we are less concerned with predicting
a specific distribution than with identifying the parameters that
influence the choice of rules for making it. We want a model
that applies to a broad range of contractual settings and incor-
porates fundamental principles universally accepted as affect-
ing the relative bargaining power of parties.
The problem with many bargaining theories is that while
they take account of the parties' relative bargaining strengths,
they assume away many of the other problems that lead to bar-
gaining failure, for example, uncertainty. Thus, they typically
yield the result that bargainers will secure a cooperative divi-
sion of the gains that reflects their initial relative bargaining
strengths. This outcome is not surprising, but because of all the
evidence of noncooperation (wars, strikes, etc.), these models
are neither predictive nor descriptive. 26 Again, though all bar-
gaining models view the relative costliness of conflict as affect-
ing relative bargaining power, many do not take into account
the parties' best hopes or aspiration levels, which influence the
bargainers' willingness to incur costs in reaching agreement.
That is inconsistent with a sizable body of experimental evi-
dence indicating that aspiration level is positively related to
bargaining power.
In contrast, what we call resistance theory renders an explicit
account of the conditions under which negotiations break
down, treats aspirations as part of the decision making calculus,
and describes the information rational contractors require to
reach agreement. Thereby, it illuminates the conditions under
which people will expend resources to contract. 28 As conceived
in resistance theory, bargainers assess the relative strengths of
their strategic positions based on the utility structure of the
game, for example, based on the location of the disagreement
point, on the location and shape of the contract curve, and on
their risk and time preferences. The strength with which a bar-
gainer strives to avoid concessions, termed his resistance, de-
26. See Cooter, supra note 18.
27. See S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, BARGAINING POWER, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES
(1981).
28. See Heckathorn, A Formal Theory of Social Exchange: Process and Outcome, in 5 CUR-
RENT PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL THEORY 145 (S. McNall ed. 1984) [hereinafter Hecka.
thorn, A Formal Theory]; Heckathorn, supra note 11.
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pends on (1) the costliness to the individual of the concessions
required by the agreement (the greater the concession cost, the
greater will be the resistance to the agreement); (2) the costli-
ness of conflict (an increase in conflict's cost increases the will-
ingness to make concessions and diminishes resistance); and
(3) the aspiration level (higher aspirations enhance resistance).
The very existence of opposing proposals reveals conflicting
aspirations. They establish concession limits and distributional
expectations based on those assessments. Only outcomes in
which those limits and expectations overlap satisfy concession
rationality.
Formally, if Di is any bargainer i's utility from disagreement
(conflict); Bi is i's aspiration level or best hope-the enforcea-
ble outcome on the contract curve that he most prefers, or
equivalently, the outcome he most prefers which is enforcea-
ble, feasible, and no worse than conflict for any other bar-
gainer; and Ui is* i's utility from a given outcome U, i's
resistance to outcome U, R,(U) is defined as
Ri= (Bi - Ui)/(Bi - D1). (4)
During negotiations, each bargainer assesses his own resist-
ance against that of others, which takes into account everyone's
strategic position. Under conditions of complete information,
each will agree to an outcome only if the concessions it requires
are at least matched by the relative concessions of others. On
the assumption of equal rationality, each party will make equal
relative concessions.29 It is not rational to be exploited. Ex-
pressed in terms of resistances, this means that the bargainer
will agree to an outcome if his own resistance to it would equal
or fall below the resistances of others. Formally, where Rj(U) is
any bargainer i's resistance to outcome U, and R(U) is another
bargainer's resistance to outcome U, then that outcome lies in
the agreement set of i, A, if
Rj(U) < Rj(U). (5)
Concession rationality requires that an actor's concession be-
havior fulfill this requirement. Resistance theory posits that in
the presence of complete information, people exhibit conces-
sion rationality. Under conditions of complete information, ra-
tional individuals make equal relative concessions. When
29. This is also David Gauthier's view. See D. GAuTHIER, supra note 11.
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information is incomplete, a bargainer will agree to an outcome
if he judges it to be rational in that sense, that is, if his own
resistance is matched or exceeded by the expected resistance of
everyone else. That is, if i's resistance to U is Ri(U), and i's
expectation concerningj's resistance to U is Ei(Rj(U)), then the
set of outcomes to which i would agree, his agreement set Ai,
includes outcomes fulfilling the requirement
Ri(U) < Ei(Rj(U)). (6)
Of course, for an outcome to be agreed upon, it must lie in the
agreement sets of each individual with the ability to block an
agreement. For example, in a system of bargainers A and B, the
outcome must lie in the intersection of sets Aa and Ab.
The implications of concession rationality for the outcome of
bargaining can be illustrated graphically. Consider Figure
Three. The outcomes when players' resistances are equal lie on
the line connecting the disagreement point D (9,2), where each
resistance equals one, to the ideal point I (19,10), a nonfeasible
outcome where players simultaneously attain their best hope
payoffs and resistances are consequently equal to zero. If per-
son A exhibits concession rationality as defined in Equation
Three, his agreement set lies on or to the right of the line ID;
and if person B is similarly rational, his agreement lies on or
above the line ID. Hence, if both exhibit concession rationality
and they possess complete information, their point of agree-
ment must lie on the line ID.
Resistance theory is one way of specifying the content of con-
cession rationality. Concession rationality in turn expresses a
condition of rational cooperation or rational contracting. Its
domain is the division of the gains from cooperation or the par-
ties' joint stakes in contracting.
The division problem can be more or less troublesome. The
magnitude of the division problem in a particular case is a func-
tion of the discrepancy between the players' best hopes. If the
individuals' best hopes exactly coincide, as in the nondivisible
prisoner's dilemma game, the contract curve shrinks to a point,
and agreement requires no concessions. As the contract curve
lengthens, the required concessions increase. That in turn
makes divisional bargaining an enterprise with higher stakes.
Consequently, expending resources to enhance the strength of
one's bargaining position becomes more rational, as do any
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Figure 3: Equal Resistance Line
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measures to minimize one's own concessions and to maximize
those secured from others.
The magnitude of the bargaining problem, MB, can be formally de-
fined in terms of potential expenditures of transaction re-
sources, as the maximum proportion of the gains attainable from
contracting that any rational contractor in the system could be motivated
to expend on transaction resources to enhance bargaining power. As thus
defined, the magnitude of the bargaining problem is the ratio
of the gain attainable from bargaining to the gain attainable
from contracting. The former is the difference between the
payoff from the individual's best-hope outcome, Bi, that is, the
most preferred point on the contract curve, and the individual's
worst hope, Wi, that is, the least preferred point on the contract
curve, which is Bi - Wi. This is the maximum amount the indi-
vidual could be rationally motivated to expend in an endeavor
to augment bargaining power. Furthermore, recall that Bi - Di
is the maximum gain attainable from contracting, so the maxi-
mum proportion of the gains from contracting that the individ-
ual could be motivated to expend on enhancing bargaining
power is
MB = (Bi - Wi)/(Bi - Ci) (7)
For example, in Figure One's system, the magnitude of player
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A's bargaining problem is MBa (19 - 16)/(19 - 9) = 0.3,
and player B's problem is MBb = (10 - 7)/(10 - 2) = 0.375.
The magnitude of the bargaining problem, MB, faced by a
group of actors is defined as the maximum problem faced by any
member of that group, that is,
MB = Max[MBi]. (8)
For example, in Figure One's system, MB = MBb = 0.375. This
expression describes the maximum proportion of the gains at-
tainable from contracting that any rational bargainer in the sys-
tem could be motivated to expend on transaction resources.
3. Post-phase: Individual Rationality
We noted above that in the non-divisible prisoner's dilemma,
there is no bargaining over the gains from cooperation. The
parties' best hopes coincide, and no concessions are required.
That is why the prisoner's dilemma is best thought of as illus-
trating the problem of rational defection, not the problem of
rational agreement. The payoffs from cooperation are set; no
concessions are required. Once agreement is secured, however,
the question remains whether it is in the interest of either or
both parties to comply with it.
The defection problem reflects the problematic nature of
mutual trust, owing to the presence in most contracts of bur-
densome provisions and potential loopholes. Frequently, an in-
dividual can gain by defaulting upon a contract, often at the
expense of those who perform according to its terms. A prereq-
uisite for contracting, then, is a system of enforcement with
which to preclude or to deter noncompliance, or to compen-
sate parties injured by others' noncompliance. Not surpris-
ingly, debating whether negotiations are undertaken in "good
faith" and carefully scrutinizing contracts for hidden loopholes
are prominent features of virtually all contracting.
The compliance or defection problem can be expressed in
terms of a third condition of rationality. A necessary condition
for rational agreement to a contract is that its expected out-
come satisfies individual rationality. Neither player will permit
himself to be left worse off than the status quo, or disagree-
ment point. That is, when Ui is individual i's expected utility
from participating in a contract, and Di is i's utility from disa-
greement, i is individually rational if
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U .> Di. (9)
With reference to Figure Three, player A prefers defection if
point NPa is to the right of the point on the contract curve at
which agreement occurs, and player B prefers defection if NPb
is above the contract point. Player A would not agree to an out-
come lying to the left of point D, such as point NPb in which B
free-rides, even though NPb is jointly rational. Such an agree-
ment would make A worse off than he would be were no agree-
ment made, thus violating the individual rationality condition.
Nor would player B accept any outcome below point D, such as
NP., for analogous reasons. Hence, if both players are individu-
ally rational, neither will tolerate the other's free-riding. The
outcomes of Figure Two's game that satisfy each player's re-
quirement of individual rationality include the status quo point,
D, and all of the poinis on the contract curve C1, C2. Rational
parties will not agree to contracts they expect to make them
worse off; thus, they must find a way to eliminate or to mini-
mize the risk of defection. This is no easy task.
A defection problem arises if either player can gain from
free-riding. The strength of the incentive to free ride depends
on the relationship between each player's unilateral defection
payoff and the payoff from points on the contract curve. In gen-
eral, that incentive is strongest when the utility awarded by
contracting is lowest. Thus, driving a hard bargain increases
the incentives for others to defect from that contract's terms,
and in consequence may be self-defeating. Notice, however,
that in Figure One's system a contractor has some incentive for
defection even if the agreement represents his best hope or
most preferred contract. Every unilateral defection outcome
gives him a payoff in excess of any cooperative outcome.
Described quantitatively, the magnitude of the defection problem,
MD, can be defined as the maximum proportion of the gains attaina-
ble from contracting that a rational individual could be motivated to ex-
pend to secure the gains potentially available by defecting. Recall that
the defection problem arises because defection is more re-
warding than cooperation. Let NPi be individual i's payofffrom
free-riding, the payoff awarded a unilateral defector. An actor's
incentive to defect is then measured by the difference between
that payoff (NPi), and the payoff from contracting, a payoff that
is minimal when the individual attains his worst hope, Wi.
Thus, the individual's maximum possible defection incentive is
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NP - Wi, indicating that he could be motivated to expend up to
NP - Wi for the privilege of free-riding with impunity rather
than contracting. When the gain from defection (NPi - W) is
divided by the gains attainable from contracting (Bi - D,), that
yields the expression for the magnitude of the individual defec-
tion incentive MDi. For any individual i, MDI is
Mm =. (NP - Wi)/(Bi - Di) (10)
For example, in Figure One's system, the magnitude of player
A's defection problem is MB, = (22 - 16)/(19 - 9) = 0.6, and
player B's problem is MBb = (11 - 7)/(10 - 2) = 0.5.
The magnitude of the defection problem faced by a group of
actors is defined as the maximum problem faced by any mem-
ber of the group, that is,
MD = Max[M ]. (11)
For example, in Figure One's system, MD = MM = 0.6. In sum,
the magnitude of the defection problems ° refers to the strength
of the incentive to defect from contracts relative to the gains
attainable from contracting.
To resolve the defection problem, each party must reduce
the other party's incentive to defect. The power of the incentive
to defect can be mitigated in several analytically distinguishable
ways. Compliance can be made more rewarding, defection less
rewarding, or opportunities to defect reduced or blocked. Of
these, the second is the most common because the first tends to
be more costly and the third tends to be impractical given the
near impossibility of removing all opportunities for nonper-
formance. In short, no party will rationally agree to comply and
to let the other party free ride. But since both parties have at
least some incentive to free ride, each party has an incentive to
deploy resources to insur6 the compliance of the other.
Individual rationality, then, requires that an agreement be en-
forceable, not just that an individual be protected against an out-
come worse than the status quo .3 To be an enforceable
30. Heckathorn & Maser, Bargaining and the Sources of Transaction Costs: The Case of
Government Regulation, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 69, 80 n.4 (1987).
31. At least in the case of cooperating to produce a public good, which can be stud-
ied as a prisoner's dilemma game, experimental evidence reveals cooperation rates sig-
nificantly better when people expect an agreement to be enforceable as compared to
when they receive money-back guarantees that they will be no worse off than when they
started if the group effort fails. See Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & Van de Kragt, Organiz-
ing Groups for Collective Action, 80 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 1171, 1183 (1986).
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agreement, the parties must expect that each estimates a cost of
violation exceeding the gain from unilaterally defecting. That
is, no agreement on C1, C2 is enforceable without penalties suf-
ficient to deter defection, termed the force of agreement.3 2
Viewed graphically, an enforcement system that penalizes
defection displaces the defection points NPa and NPb toward
the origin, making compliance more rewarding relative to de-
fection. In Figure Three, for example, if each player faces a vio-
lation cost that makes him indifferent between defecting and
his best-hope outcome, then no points on the contract curve
will be enforceable. But if each faces a violation cost that makes
him indifferent between defecting and the other party's best
hope outcome, then the entire contract curve constitutes a do-
main of enforceable agreements.
In general, the greater an individual's defection incentive,
the stronger must be the penalties that would succeed in mak-
ing compliance rational. Further, the greater the incentive to
defect, the stronger are the incentives for the individual to seek
to evade or undermine an enforcement system. Put simply, the
more a person wants to defect, the harder and more costly it
will be to prevent him from doing so. Although it is not rational
to accept a contract that is unenforceable, or one that gives
others the opportunity to defect, making a contract enforceable
requires expenditure of considerable resources. The greater
the incentive to defect, the greater the resources required to
prevent it.
C. Summary of Rational Contracting
The resistance solution to a bargaining game of complete in-
formation can be described in terms of the rationality condi-
tions. Individual and joint rationality, which together comprise
the classical notion of economic rationality,"3 together suffice
to motivate contracting but not agreement on any unique con-
tract. With reference to Figure Two, they restrict the outcomes
of agreement to the portion of the welfare frontier called the
contract curve, C1, C2. This contains, of course, many feasible
outcomes. In classical economic theory, no choice among them
can be said to be more or less rational than any other. The
32. See Heckathorn, A Foral Theory, supra note 28, at 153.
33. SeeJ. HARsAwi, supra note 25, at 141-42.
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choice among them cannot be a matter of rationality! Thus, in
the usual forms of economic analysis, the choice among Pareto
optimal (collectively or jointly) outcomes is said to be a matter
of distributive fairness, not a matter of economics (or
rationality).
The additional requirement of concession rationality, the sig-
nature of the bargaining theory approach we adopt, restricts
that outcome to a point on the equal resistance line, ID in Fig-
ure Three, so the cumulative effect of these requirements is to
specify the intersection of the contract curve and the equal
resistance line. For bargainers A and B with complete informa-
tion, the outcome of the bargaining U satisfies the expression
min[Ra(U) = Rb(U)I (12)
Agreement and performance on a contract occur, then, if and
only if it satisfies all three requirement for each party to the
transaction. Taken together, then, these conditions are neces-
sary and sufficient; they define a party's interests in a contrac-
tual relationship.'
Bargaining theory differs from the more common forms of
economic analysis precisely by its commitment to a principle of
concession rationality. This principle is aimed at explaining
and defending some outcomes along the frontier as more ra-
tional than others. Concession or bargaining theory thus makes
the division of the gains from contracting, that is, the distribu-
tion of the game's stakes, a matter of rationality. Unlike forms
of economic analysis that set aside questions of distribution, ra-
tional bargaining theory takes the division problem to be a part
of the problem of rational choice. As a consequence, conces-
sion theory not only can explain and defend outcomes of con-
tracting as more or less rational depending on the way in which
the gains are distributed; it can explain safeguards in con-
tracting aimed at securing certain divisions, and failures in con-
tracting as often resulting from failures to solve the bargaining
or concession problem, or as owing to the high costs of safe-
guarding agreed upon divisions.
34. The conclusions reached here also hold in the n.person cases and in the dynamic
context. We use the static one to simplify the analysis. See Heckathorn, A Formal Theory,
supra note 28.
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III. SAFEGUARDING THE RATIONAL CONTRACT
In the model we have just explicated, bargaining, takes place
sequentially (at least in logical space-time). First individuals
search for potentially advantageous opportunites to cooperate,
then they seek agreement on the gains, and finally they monitor
compliance with the contract's terms. Each phase leaves plenty
of room for contract failure. Thus, guarding against failure is
rational-up to a point. That is, one does not want to spend
more on preventing failure than failure costs in terms of fore-
gone benefit. The important analytic point is that at least some
expenditure of resources to guard against contract failure is ra-
tional for all players. We call this process of expending re-
sources to prevent contract failure, "rational safeguarding."
The order in which. actors safeguard their interests in con-
tracting reverses the order in which they contract (again in logi-
cal space-time). In the divisible prisoner's dilemma, both
parties have incentives to defect from unprotected agreements.
If it is rational for player A to defect from an agreement, then it
cannot be rational for player B to bargain. with player A over
the gains from trade, and vice versa. Bargaining without compli-
ance is simply a waste of resources and is, therefore, irrational.
If bargaining over the gains from trade is to be rational, the
parties must be reasonably confident of one another's subse-
quent compliance. Thus, the defection problem must be re-
solved prior to pursuing a division of contract gains.35 Similar
considerations apply regarding the other phases of bargaining.
Crafting safeguards to satisfy joint rationality is pointless un-
less the parties expect both the division and defection
problems to be soluble. Early phase decisions are dependent
upon expectations regarding decisions in a later phase; antici-
pating breakdown at a later phase may block affirmative deci-
sions at a prior one.
Each party would prefer that the other bear the full costs of
safeguarding. The parties in general cannot insist upon this
preference. Concessions are rational, and parties can secure an
agreement about distributing the costs of safeguarding. This
"contract," that is, the contract over safeguards, has all the
same conditions and pitfalls of bargaining over the gains from
35. See Kraus & Coleman, Morality and the Theoy of Rational Choice, 97 ETmcs 715
(1987).
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trade. So in the complete rational contract, the parties bargain
both over the costs of safeguarding and over the gains from
trade.
Negotiations over safeguards in a contract comprise a series
of nested subgames, corresponding to a type of sequential de-
cision-making that Shubik terms "backward induction."3 6
Here, the outcome of one game effects the potential payoffs of
the next and issues are analyzed in the reverse of their ultimate
behavioral order. Treating the divisible prisoner's dilemma in
this way transforms it from a single game in which the defection
incentive dominates, so contracting never gets underway, into
two cooperative games.
The two cooperative games are then analyzed as follows. The
first game involves negotiating over enforcement costs. In this
game, we once again assume that the players command
resurces adequate to enforce an agreement, so that they need
not call upon third-party enforcement mechanisms. (This as-
sumption is crucial; otherwise, the account cannot proceed. For
otherwise we will generate an infinite regress of nonenforce-
able contracts.) The only question at this stage-in this game-
is, who shall bear which costs in solving the defection problem?
If this bargaining problem is solved, then the second coopera-
tive game is played. The players' mutual interest is to bargain
over points on the contract curve only. The'enforceable solu-
tions to the second game therefore lie on the contract curve.
Thus, the second bargaining game is over points on the curve.
The .first, or enforcement, game is connected to the second,
or division-of-the-gains game in three ways. First, solving the
enforcement game is a necessary condition for playing the divi-
sion game; second, any particular solution to the enforcement
game will affect solutions to the division game. How much one
is willing to concede in bargaining over the gains from trade
may well depend on how much one has had to expend in creat-
ing safeguards against defection. Third, because they are both
bargaining games, the theory of rational bargaining developed
above applies to both. In principle there should be equilibrium
solutions to the conjunction of these two games that satisfy the
rationality conditions.
36. See M. SHUBICK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLU-
TIONS (1982); see also T. SCHELLING, supra note 15; Heckathorn, A Formal Theoty, supra
note 28.
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In general, party A will create a safeguard so long as the po-
tential burden imposed on B to overcome it exceeds the cost to
A of creating it; party A expects B to have a comparable incen-
tive.3 7 The equilibrium effect of following these strategies gives
rise to an optimizing effect. When parties contract with one an-
other, they bargain so as to minimize the sum of the costs play-
ers impose on each other and the costs they must bear to
safeguard themselves. Under conditions of complete information
both cooperative games are solved so that the following is true:
a rational contract minimizes the sum of the costs the players
impose on one another and the costs they bear to protect
themselves.
A. Safeguarding Against Uncertainty
Problems in contracting arise when information is not com-
plete, when instead actors are required to behave under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Almost every contract dispute that winds
up in litigation turns on a point about an incomplete contract;
the traditional reasons for incomplete contracts are matters of
information cost: 1) a contingency may be unforeseeable; 2)
planning for every foreseeable contingency can be expensive;
and 3) some contingencies may involve private information. In-
deed, because a complete contract must specify a suitable
mechanism for transmitting information to deal with contin-
gencies, it can be particularly costly to devise. Therefore, actual
contracts tend to be incomplete and subject to renegotiation."
When bargainers possess less than complete information,
failure to identify opportunities for gain or fear of outcomes
worse than the status quo can prevent contracting from even
getting off the ground. Once it does, agreement can still be
blocked or the point of agreement may diverge from the con-
tract curve's equal resistance outcome.3 9 For example, if bar-
gainers underestimate one another's resistances, they demand
more concessions than the other will grant, and the result is
37. The comparisions here, as with those involved in making concessions, entail no
invalid interpersonal comparisions of utility. The calculus for creating safeguards fol-
lows the calculus of resistance theory. In resistance theory, people are comparing con-
cessions normalized with respect to each individual's stake in the game. Because the
mathematical expressions take the form of the ratio of two utility differences, resis-
tances are validly comparable across individuals. In this way, resistance theory captures
a prominent feature of actual bargaining and actual equity judgments.
38. Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation; 94 J. POL. EcoN. 235, 239 (1986).
39. See Heckathorn, A Formal Theory, supra note 28, at 161-68.
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conflict. Unresolved conflict does not entail that the rationality
conditions are violated. Rather, divergences from the outcome
predictable under complete information are predictable conse-
quences of rational actors facing imperfect information. Bar-
gaining with incomplete information can be both rational and
unsuccessful.
If uncertainty exists, each party may benefit by manipulating
information to create the appearance that conflict has become
less costly to him or more costly to others. That makes his
threats credible and signals an unwillingness to give in. Simi-
larly, every bargainer possesses incentives to oversell his own
preferred contract while denigrating the other's preferred con-
tract. And each possesses incentives to invest in safeguards
against precisely this sort of behavior because it threatens the
divisions to which they would otherwise agree.
One consequence of this analysis is that the main reason for
expending resources in contracting is to overcome some sort of
uncertainty, uncertainty that threatens the equilibrium solution
to which rational actors would otherwise agree. Because the
possible sources of uncertainty differ in each phase of con-
tracting, the logical character of the costs rational bargainers
are willing to incur to reduce uncertainty differ as well.
People incur search costs because they are uncertain about the
feasibility of alternative outcomes. Each bargainer wants in-
formation about the group's prospects. To resolve the coordi-
nation problem, information about group gains, or the
opportunities to secure a Pareto improvement, is necessary. It
helps to motivate contracting that satisfies the joint rationality
condition.
People incur bargaining and decision costs because they are un-
certain about the acceptability of alternative divisions. Each
bargainer wants information about the agreement set. Securing
adequate information about one another's resistances is neces-
sary to create an agreement that satisfies the concession rationality
condition.
People incur monitoring costs because they are uncertain about
the enforceability of alternative outcomes. Each bargainer
wants information about the consequences of the other party's
defecting. In that sense, information about the force of the
agreement is relevant to creating an enforceable contract that
satisfies the individual rationality condition.
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If an individual need only estimate his expected utility for the
outcomes possible under a proposed contract against that of the
status quo to ensure that its terms are no worse than not con-
tracting, then the information required to judge outcomes by
this test is the least stringent of all. But because each party
needs to estimate the defection incentive and the force of
agreement, then, in addition to the information needed to esti-
mate joint and concession rationality, each must estimate NPa
and NPb.
Significantly, each phase of contracting entails greater risks
than the preceding one because, as an inspection of equations
(1)-(12) reveals, more terms come into play at each step, so
more information is required by succeeding calculations. That
means more potential sources of uncertainty exist, more esti-
mates must be made, each with a risk of error. In other words,
the mathematics suggests that gathering information sufficient
to fashion safeguards against defection is more difficult than
securing information sufficient to safeguard against exploitive
divisions, and so on. The more general point is that by incur-
ring search, bargaining, and decision costs, individual contrac-
tors are able to mitigate ex ante risks; by incurring monitoring
costs they hope to mitigate ex post risks. Thus, one can under-
stand the object of contracting as the joint attempt to minimize
the sum of the costs of uncertainty and of its avoidance, when
uncertainty afflicts all three dimensions of rationality.40
40. This generalizes a formulation found in G. CALAB E s, THE COST OF AcciDENTS
26-31 (1970), and implied in Cooter's analysis of Coasian versus Hobbesian perspec-
tives on assigning liability, a seminal application of bargaining theory to legal issues, see
Cooter, supra note 18. The Coasian perspective supposes the obstacle to cooperation
is the cost of communicating, so courts need only enforce private agreements; Cooter
recognizes that the strategic nature of the situation and the absence of a division rule
may prclude cooperation, even when communication costs are zero, evoking a more
intrusive court. However, Cooter's perspective does not count the cost of concessions
as part of the strategic problem to which a court might attend. The Hobbesian perspec-
tive supposes that bargainers increase their demands on each other at every opportu-
nity, defeating cooperation unless a third party exists to dictate the terms of a contract.
Cooter recognizes that people may adapt their strategies to achieve an agreement,
evoking a less intrusive court. He concludes that institutions such as markets serve
efficiency without an extraordinarily intrusive state because a market eliminates the
power of parties to threaten each other. But the proper standard of efficiency is gener-
ating optimal threats, not eliminating threats. Our analysis joins the Coasian and
Hobbesian treatments of law, making the court's role contingent on contextual features
of social relationships that defeat cooperation.
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B. Factors Affecting Uncertainty
Different but often related contextual features influence the
ability of decision makers to estimate the terms comprising the
calculus of contracting; that is, they affect the amount and accu-
racy of the information that must be acquired, verified, commu-
nicated, or processed during the course of contracting.
First, as the number ofprincipal parties to the potential contract
increases, the number of lines of communication and the
amount of information that must be processed during negotia-
tion increases. Opportunities for joint gain can be obscured
simply by the noise. Group size affects the defection problem
because in larger groups an individual's defection tends to be
less noticeable, weakening incentives for individuals to partici-
pate in sanctioning defectors.4 1 Monitoring compliance in a
large group is generally more difficult and more demanding of
given resources than in a smaller group. Hence, contracting is
riskier.
Second, as heretogeneity among the principal parties increases, the
bargaining range-if one exists-and defection incentives in-
crease. To be sure, differences of preference are required to
provide a basis for exchange and contract, but the less inter-
changeable the actors, the more difficult the transaction. For
example, the commonality among workers at particular job
sites facilitiates collective bargaining with Inanagement. Only
minor adjustments are required to adjust for individual differ-
ences in seniority, skill level, and work classification. By con-
trast, when each party to a contract possesses a wholly unique
set of attributes and relations to each other participant, bar-
gaining may prove impossible even in a quite small group. Any
bargain ultimately struck will inevitably leave more people dis-
gruntled and, therefore, will create higher, more disparate de-
fection incentives than would an agreement among a more
homogeneous assembly.
Third, as the spatial dispersion of the group increases, commu-
nication costs increase. Bargaining and enforcement systems
both require communication. In geographically concentrated
groups, oral communication and incidental observations of be-
havior may suffice, but linking a dispersed group with equally
adequate communication between each pair of individuals is
41. See M. O.soN, THE Looxc OF Co.EcrcvE ACFION 45 (1965).
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technically more difficult. Conversely, improvements in the
technology of communication, holding dispersion constant, re-
duce communication costs, so transaction resources go further.
Fourth, as the temporal distribution of the costs or benefits at
issue in the transaction increases, they become more difficult to
detect and control. For example, delayed defection costs im-
pede monitoring because the adverse consequences become
apparent only long after the fact. Similarly, delayed benefits
hamper divisional bargaining because bargaining to allocate
anticipated gains may appear to be an exercise in wishful
thinking.
Fifth, and closely related, as the level of acceptable risk de-
creases, monitoring problems increase. If people engaged in
contracting for the sheer thrill of it, then even expending re-
sources in search of opportunities for gain might appear
counterproductive. But in classical economics and game the-
ory, the expected utility of a prospect is the product of its
probability and utility. An actor who is rational in that sense is
indifferent, for example, between the certainty of losing $10, a
1/10 chance of losing $100, and a 1/100 chance of losing
$1,000. Yet such outcomes are not equivalent in their implica-
tions for contracting. In contrast to defection that imposes a
certain cost, "defection" that merely creates a risk of damage
can remain undetected unless actual harm occurs. Monitoring
is especially difficult when defection results in a very small risk
of grave damage (analogous to the 1/100 chance of losing
$1000), because only a tiny portion of defections actually im-
pose damage. Just as the absence of damage does not imply
that no defection occurred, the presence of a damage does not
necessarily prove defection. Risk is simply endemic. That is
why so much contract litigation involves assigning liability in
the case of an unforeseen contingency that affects the ability of
one party to perform.
Sixth, as the nontransferability of costs and benefits increases, ne-
gotiating becomes more intractable. Bargaining determines
how benefits and costs will be allocated, so it requires that at
least some benefits or costs be transferable. The problems of
quantifying and intersubjectively verifying nontransferable
benefits and costs underlie the distinction between fungible
and unique goods that has been used, for example, to justify
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the choice between damages and specific performance in con-
tract disputes.
Seventh, as instability increases within a relationship, more
transaction resources are required to secure rational outcomes.
The best way of understanding how instability increases costs is
to understand how stability reduces them. Because decisions
themselves convey information about the risks of interacting,
frequent and consistent decisions reduce the incentives to ex-
pend transaction resources on searching and bargaining over
acceptable divisions. Moreover, stability facilitates developing
internal systems of enforcement with which to deter defection.
For egoists in repeated plays of the same prisoner's dilemma
game, cooperation rather than defection can become optimal
because defection would disrupt a mutually rewarding pattern
of cooperation.4 2 If the short-term gains from defection are
consistently offset by larger long term losses, a stable pattern of
cooperation emerges.
C. The Rational Expenditure of Transaction Resources
This is a good time to recap the analysis to this point. (1)
Rational conti-actors seek to create mutually advantageous, en-
forceable agreement. (2) Doing so requires that they satisfy
three independent rationality conditions: joint, concession and
individual rationality. (3).These rationality conditions corre-
spond to three phases in the contract process and enable the
parties to solve three problems of rational choice: (a) the pre-
phase coordination problem (joint rationality), (b) the negotia-
tion-phase division problem (concession rationality), (c) the
post-phase compliance problem (individual rationality). (4) A
process of rational bargaining can satisfy these conditions but
still fail to reach fruition in virtue of uncertainty deriving either
from incomplete or imperfect information, or from potential
defection. (5) Consequently, it will be rational for parties to
create safeguards against contract failure. (6) Creating safe-
guards requires parties to incur three distinct kinds of cost cor-
responding to the phases in contracting: (a) search costs (pre-
phase), (b) decision costs (negotiation phase), (c) monitoring
costs (post-phase). (7) The magnitude of these costs will de-
pend on contextual factors shaping the extent of uncertainty
42. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 174 (1984).
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under particular circumstances. (8) In general, the magnitude
of uncertainty is greatest in guarding against defection, less
great in securing a division and least pressing in safeguarding
against coordination failure. (9) Rationality requires that craft-
ing safeguards proceed in the opposite temporal direction from
contracting corresponding to the general magnitude of risk of
failure. Because the risk of defection dominates in the
nondivisible prisoner's dilemma, uncertainty about compliance
is greatest and, consequently, crafting safeguards against defec-
tion is most pressing. (10) The process of creating safeguards
can itself be modeled as a rational bargain over the costs of
safeguards. The costs of safeguarding depletes transaction
resources.
The capacity of the contractors to employ their own re-
sources to reduce uncertainty and create safeguards can be rep-
resented graphically. Figure Four describes the types of




interactions to which contractual arrangements may be
matched in the form of a transaction space diagram. The vertical
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axis represents the magnitude of the defection problem. The
horizontal axis represents the magnitude of the dividsion prob-
lem. And the axis perpendicular to both of these represents the
magnitude of the coordination problem.
When a transaction lies near the origin in Figure Four, so
that the problems are quite minor, the burden placed upon
transaction resources is minimal. In transactions at increasing
distances from the origin, indicating that the problems of iden-
tifying prospects, of bargaining or of defection are more major,
the availability of transaction resources becomes more prob-
lematic; the farther any transaction lies from the origin, the
greater the transaction costs required for contracting.
In contexts in which the seven factors affecting uncertainty
are favorable to contracting, only modest resources are required
to make contracting possible. For example, small residential
groups such as nuclear families possess sufficient endogenous
transaction resources with which to develop exceedingly com-
plex systems of mutual understandings. Similarly, conditions in
the most hospitable region of transaction space (that is, the
area dose to the origin) correspond rather well to those identi-
fied in any introductory economics text as conducive to private
exchange in perfect or near perfect markets. Even in the (other-
wise) most inhospitable regions of transaction space, that is, far
upward and to the right of the origin but still within the fron-
tier, ingenious safeguards evolve, such as "exchanging hos-
tages" and giving collateral,4 where people arrive at and
enforce contracts independently.
In contexts where the factors affecting uncertainty are unfa-
vorable to contracting, the parties' transaction resources
quickly become exhausted. The worst case arises when mem-
bers of a large, geographically dispersed group with diverse in-
terests consider negotiating an arrangement in which the
benefits and costs are delayed, nontransferable, and laden with
risk. Locating a national nuclear waste storage facility is an ex-
ample. Here, the transaction resource frontier will lie close to
the origin, indicating that even slight concern over the feasibil-
ity of the alternatives or modest division or defection problems
exceed the group's ability to contract independently.
43. See Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & Ogo. 5 (1985).
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IV. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION
A. The Preference for Endogenous Transaction Resources
We need not presume that a forum external to the original
setting of a contract-notably,. authoritative experts like judges
operating under the auspices of the state-will be more effica-
cious than private ordering in resolving disputes. This pre-
sumption, termed "legal centralism," informs much of the law
and economics tradition.44 That courts or other jurisdictional
bodies are necessary to the very idea of contract and are
thereby presupposed by the concept itself may simply be an un-
warranted theoretical assumption. It does not follow from any-
thing in the analysis presented to this point. To be sure, by
assuming that courts exist and stand prepared to enforce
whatever agreements private parties make, such a view isolates
the problem of breach from those of cooperation and division.
In doing so, however, it misleads. For tradeoffs are inevitable
among all three problems in contracting. Moreover, judges at-
tempting to make decisions in accord with the theory are de-
nied insights about the constraints rational actors would want
on the judges as third-party interveners. Private parties-in-
cluding social scientists-may find judicial decisions less coher-
ent. Indeed, the resource efficiency of decisions motivated by
the paradigm is put in doubt. On grounds of theory, predic-
tion, and policy, the presumption should be struck down in
favor of a more realistic one.
Third-party intervention must be explained, not assumed.
And it is more plausibly assumed if we start out presuming that
people are never without some endogenous transaction re-
sources with which to contract. That means they do not always
rely upon or even want a third party to secure agreements.
Endogenous resources, however, are finite. The points in
transaction space at which private parties exhaust these re-
sources define what we term the transaction-resource frontier. The
frontier is simply a way of visualizing the limits to private settle-
ment and the reasons for involving a third party. Attainable
gains are lost when contextual features place transactions be-
yond the frontier and block contracting. That provides an in-
44. See 0. WLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Ga-
lamer, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 1 (1981); Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704 (1931).
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centive for parties to the transaction to seek third-party
intervention. When transactions lie outside the transaction-re-
sources frontier, principal parties tend to seek third-party
support.
A third party can facilitate contracting in any of three analyti-
cally distinct ways. First, it can help to resolve the coordination
problem by providing exogenous transaction resources to augment
the endogenous transaction resources already present in the
relationship. If, for example, communication channels are
poor, owing to the large number of parties or their geographic
dispersion, the centralized channels and information-processing.
services provided by a mediating third party may well prove more
efficient. Sometimes a mediator recognizes opportunites for
mutual gain or audits the status quo more effectively than the
principals. Described graphically, this type of intervention
moves transactions inside the transaction-resources frontier, or
in effect increases the region within which contracting among
the principal parties becomes possible. It need not entail grant-
ing discretion to the mediator to allocate the gains by defining
the terms of an agreement or to enforce one by punishing
breach.
Second, third parties can help to resolve the division prob-
lem by providihg division services, for example, a coalition-building
or arbitrating third party may be granted discretion to allocate
the gains under the contract, or merely to narrow the range of
divisions possible under the contract. Described graphically,
this moves the transaction leftward in transaction space, closer
to the origin where conditions for contracting are more
favorable. It need not entail granting discretion to the arbiter
to enforce an agreement, but arbiters, like mediators, need to
be a central agent in processing information.
Third, third parties can help to resolve the defection prob-
lem by providing enforcement services: for example, a policing third
party may be granted discretion to punish defectors so as to
increase the force of contractual agreements. Described graphi-
cally, this moves the transaction downward in transaction
space, again closer to the origin. It may not entail granting the
enforcer discretion to design the terms of an agreement, but to
monitor behavior an enforcer needs centralized communica-
tion channels like a mediator, and in applying the force of
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agreement across disputants, the enforcer's judgments may
well involve arbiter-like divisioned responsibility.
The existence of finite resources and the need sometimes to
expend more than what the parties have available to them cre-
ates an incentive for both parties to seek outside help in making
and securing contracts. Intervention by a third party, however,
may be as problematic as it is promising. First, intervention by
a third party complicates the transaction by creating a new con-
tracting problem between it and the principal parties. An n-
person game becomes an n+ 1 person game. The more exten-
sive the intervention, the more powerful the third party can be-
come vis-a-vis the principals.
The third party creates a new coordination problem. The
process of searching for a suitable third party and negotiating
the terms of its performance is costly. Improperly crafted third
party services may prove redundant or unnecessarily intrusive.
The greater the intervenor's role in processing information
and forging communication channels, the greater too becomes
the potential asymmetry between the intervenor and the princi-
pals. That can impede the principals' efforts to monitor it as
well as each other. In short, the principals may not find it
worthwile to involve a third party even when it is a prerequisite
to contracting.
Intervention is likely to create a new division problem. How
are the residual gains from intervention to be allocated among
the principal and third parties? Again, the answer depends on
their relative bargaining power. The power of the principals
depends on how well they can effect divisions before the inter-
venor becomes involved. But the more extensive the inter-
venor's role in determining how contractual gains will be
divided, the greater its potential to seize a larger than antici-
pated share. Greater too is the potential for the intervenor to
become embroiled in partisan disputes among the principals
and to empower some at the expense of others.
Intervention also creates a new defection problem. The
outside party may fear that the principal parties will default on
payments after services have been rendered. Alternatively, the
more extensive the intervenor's role in establishing enforce-
ment, the greater its potential to punish exploitatively. Indeed,
a third party's special access to and control over information
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makes more difficult the principal parties' problem of prevent-
ing its defection by fraud or misrepresentation.
For these reasons, third-party intervention will always strike
the principal parties as potentially more threatening than rely-
ing on equivalent endogenous resources. The implication is that
people will prefer using endogenous resources not only be-
cause they tend to be less costly, more accessible spatially and
temporally, and more readily mobilized than functionally
equivalent resources that might be provided by a third party,
but also because these resources are less burdened by risk.
Moreover, having maximum involvement in shaping the con-
tract helps ensure the principals that it takes efficient account
of their preferences and so strengthens their incentives to
honor its terms. Studies of arbitration, for example, show that
bargainers who succeed in reaching agreement are more likely
to honor it than are those who fail and have one imposed by an
arbitrator. Finally, even under the simplest conditions, con-
tracting with a third party is asymmetric because the original
parties, being more numerous, must bargain among them-
selves first.
Many of the problems of third-party intervention can be miti-
gated by competition among providers of the service. Competi-
tion gives principals an alternative and, thereby, a safeguard.
Thus, it can reduce their bargaining probleni and their fear of
exploitive mistreatment. This is an important point, because it
gives analytic plausibility to suggestions that under conditions
in which it is otherwise particularly difficult to constrain a third
party, competition among mediators, arbiters, and enforcers
may be preferable to a state monopoly on power.45
Still, establishing and maintaining a mechanism for third-
party intervention is no mere technical exercise by which defi-
ciencies in endogenous transaction resources are corrected.
Rather it can be at least as conflictive and politically charged as
private contracting. It, too, can fail. Thus, parties have incen-
tives to avoid third-party orderings, such as courts provide, and
instead to devise private orderings. 46
45. See Barnett, PursuingJustke in a Free Society: Part One--Power vs. Liberty, CRitM.JusT.
Ermics 50 (Summer-Fall 1985).
46. See Galanter, supra note 44.
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B. .When Only Intervention Will Do
The existence of uncertainty sufficient to threaten contract
failure does not provide a sufficient reason for the parties to
call upon third-party intervention. Only when endogenous
transaction resources are depleted do the parties have suffi-
cient reason to pursue outside intervention. As we demon-
strated above, third-party intervention can create costs in
excess of gains. Only if the endogenous resources of the parties
are inadequate and the expected costs of third-party interven-
tion do not exceed expected gains, would it be rational for con-
tractors to require third-party intervention.
Figure Four depicts the range of cases in which safeguarding
against contract failure requires the parties to consume transac-
tion resources. 47 Type I cases fall within the frontier where be-
tween them the parties possess adequate resources to resolve
whatever problems they face. Moving outward along each axis,
endogenous resources prove to be increasingly inadequate. In
type II cases, the parties possess internal resources sufficient to
solve division and defection problems, but lack resources to
identify opportunities for coordination. In type III cases, the
parties possess internal resources adequate to identify feasible
contracts and to solve the division problem, but are unable by
using their own resources to solve the defection problem. In
type IV cases, the parties possess internal resources sufficient
to solve their defection problem, but are incapable on their
own of identifying or solving the division issues. Off the axes,
we find a universe of other cases in which the principals in vary-
ing degrees lack the resources to resolve combinations of these
problems.
This model suggests that we should find that several differ-
ent types of institutional arrangements emerge in contracting.
First, there will exist cases in which private parties are able to
47. The axes and frontier correspond in part to a classification system described in
Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16J. LEGAL STUD.
67, 69-71 (1987). Ellickson sees administering positive and negative sanctions as in-
volving rules that divide human behavior into three categories: (1) good behavior trig-
gers rewards; that can have something to do with doctrines encouraging concession-
making as well as trust; (2) bad behavior triggers punishment; his concern here is
dearly with doctrines discouraging defection; and (3) ordinary behavior that warrants
nojudicial response; this corresponds to our type I situation where parties have suffi-
dent endogenous resources. As he put it, "The prevalence of tripatite systems is a clue
that rulemakers are attuned to an overarching goal of minimizing costs, including ad-
ministrative costs." Id at 71.
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solve their problems without recourse to the intervention of
third parties. In fact we find such institutions. The best exam-
ple is the competitive market. In the market parties are en-
gaged in bilateral agreements, discrete in time and place. A
governmental enforcement mechanism is not necessarily a pre-
condition for exchange; self-enforcing convention-sometimes
called customary business practices-can work just as well.
Markets provide ready sources of alternative exchange oppor-
tunities that can be sufficient to safeguard against one party's
defecting before either performs on an agreement. Without
resorting to violence or invoking third-party intervention, pri-
vate parties can depend on reputational effects and devices like
hostage-giving to safeguard against the risks of defection after
one party acts in reliance on a promised performance.
Transactions along the coordination axis beyond the transac-
tion-resource frontier pose a risk of joint failure sufficient to
exhaust the parties' resources for identifying opportunities for
mutual gain; that discourages exchange. The simplest conven-
tion, like drivers slowing down on approaching an intersection
and stopping to wave a crossing vehicle through, break down.
More densely settled areas and a more heterogeneous popula-
tion of drivers will strain the convention, pushing the risks of
motorized travel to the point where people begin to forgo its
benefits or endure increasing costs. Someone can reduce the
strain simply by setting a rule, almost any rule: when two vehi-
des approach an intersection simultaneously, the vehicle on
the right proceeds first; where traffic density makes simultaneity
increasingly expensive and variable to judge, install a traffic
signal.
Contract law has, for example, the mailbox rule: an offeree
has power to accept and close a contract by mailing a letter of
acceptance, properly stamped and addressed.48 Little economic
justification can be found to support dating the contract from
the mailing of the acceptance rather than from its receipt. Its
economic justification can be found in the market-expanding
properties of having a rule.49 Like trade associations in various
industries that develop consensus standards for product attrib-
48. See A. CORIN, CORBIN ON CoNMrACTrs 124 (1952).
49. "One of the parties must carry the risk of loss and inconvenience. We need a
definite rule; but we must choose one. We can put the risk on either party; but we must
not leave it in doubt. The party not carrying the risk can then act promptly and with
confidence in reliance on the contract; the party carrying the risk can insure against it if
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utes so as to expand the total market for their products, the
court expands the resource frontier so that private parties will
engage in more transactions.
Beyond the frontier along the division axis, the participants
primarily lack resources with which to solve the division prob-
lem. The parties would not get to the division problem without
having identified an opportunity for productive exchange.
Solving the defection problem is less significant, either because
of ample internal enforcement resources or because incentives
to defect are comparatively weak.
Some scholars have noticed the significance of the division
problem in contract doctrine. But almost all of these scholars
have confused the rational division problem as a matter of pri-
vate law with a social or public theory of "fair distribution." For
example, Farber suggests that contract law has a mandatory
risk sharing system, a social safety net, and it is difficult for par-
ties to bargain around it.° Thus, although freedom of contract
means the power of parties to allocate risks between them-
selves, some contract rules reveal a countermanding principle
of loss spreading, for example, rules against penalty clauses
and warranty disclosure for personal injury to prevent cata-
strophic losses to one party. Similarly, Dalton has claimed that
doctrines such as quasi-contract, duress, and unconscionability
police the limits of acceptable bargains by private parties in the
name of social (public) norms of fairness.5" And Cohen claims
that court adjudication supplements an original contract as a
means of distributing gains and losses from unanticipated
events. In this view, contract law consists of rules by which the
courts accomplish this according to the equities of such cases.
That follows not from the agreement between individuals but
as a way of enforcing some kind of distributive justice within
the legal system.52
These characterizations of the distributive dimensions of
contract law may go too far. Our model implies that when
courts impose distributive schemes on the parties, their doing
so is compatible with the interests of the parties in the contract.
he so desires. The business rule throwing the risk on the offeror has the merit of dos-
ing the deal more quickly and enabling the performance more promptly." Id at 126.
50. See Farber, supra note 18, at 336.
51. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 999,
1001 (1985).
52. See M. COHEN, LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 101-02 (1967).
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No appeal to a global concern for distributive fairness, there-
fore, is necessary to understand or to justify a court's willing-
ness to impose a distribution of risk among the parties. The
legitimate exercise of that authority is restricted to the domain
of outcomes the parties would have bargained within, and not
to the set of outcomes that would be preferable from the point
of view of a principle of social justice or social insurance. How-
ever, to the extent that the court, acting as an arbiter, seeks to
implement a doctrine likely to resolve a wide range of division
disputes efficiently, it may turn to widely accepted principles of
social justice for guidance on the grounds that those principles
themselves represent an evolved, rational or efficient solution
to a wide range of division problems.
Transactions beyond the frontier along the defection axis in-
dicate the defection problem is intractable internally but the
cooperation and division problems are soluble. Parties here
have relatively abundant internal bargaining resources but defi-
cient internal enforcement resources. Intervention therefore
takes the form of an externally applied enforcement system that
moves the transactions downward, inside the frontier. Within
the constraints of that system, individuals retain control over
the terms of the contracts they enter.
The features that make a market such an attractive govern-
ance system-anonymity, sponteneity, disaggregated decisions
adaptive to local circumstances--exacerbate the endemic risks
of defection. Classical economists at least since Adam Smith
have foreseen a productive role for a centralized enforcing
agent. If third-party intervention diminishes ex post risks, peo-
ple are freer to expend resources ex ante on searching for and
reaching agreements that satisfy joint and concession rational-
ity. Hence, common-law, judicially crafted safeguards that pe-
nalize contract breach are widely regarded as promoting
economic efficiency.
Of course third-party safeguards designed primarily to re-
duce the probability of defection can influence the concession
rationality of private decisions. That is because the remedies
available under contract cannot escape dividing the residual
risks of social intercourse and imposing different burdens of
proof on the affected parties when one defaults. 53
53. For examples, see the essays in THE EcONOMICS OF CONTAcr LAW (A. Kronman
& R. Posner eds. 1979).
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In areas of transaction space away from an axis and outside
the frontier, the internal deficit of transaction resources is more
profound. Here, assistance is required in solving a combination
of problems that afflict contractual relationships. Indeed, even
if in absolute terms a relationship is richly endowed with trans-
action resources, it is virtually assured of falling farthest from
the three axes when all of the contextual features we identified
impose large obstacles to contracting. Consequently, the de-
gree of third-party intervention is greater because the third
party must not only enforce contracts but also specify their
terms and bring contractors to the bargaining table.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CoNTRACr LAw
Our theory implies the following about contractual relation-
ships: (1) not every effort to contract in the absence of law will
succeed; (2) contract failure can result from a failure to solve
problems of either (a) coordination, (b) division or (c) defec-
tion (compliance); (3) these problems are in principle solvable
by rational parties negotiating with complete information; (4)
contract failure is, therefore, best thought of as owing to some
form of uncertainty; (5) parties to an agreement seek to reduce
uncertainty by expending endogenous resources; (6) contract
failure in the absence of law results when these efforts at safe-
guarding are inadequate.
That implies the following about law: (1) law as a means of
safeguarding can not, therefore, be assumed by a theory of
contract, but must be explained instead; (2) the best explana-
tion of it is that law is rational for contractors only if (a) it pro-
vides exogenous transaction resources that are necessary to
insure a successful contract, and (b) the benefits of appealing to
law to enable contracting exceed its costs. (3) Once law is in
place, however, it is less costly for individuals to appeal to it to
help resolve their contractual disputes than it would have been
for them to create law for these purposes. (4) In reviewing cases
in contract to understand or to criticize developing legal rules,
we should inquire into whether uncertainty in coordination, di-
vision or compliance is the source of contract failure. We want
to know whether the parties are in court because they lack suffi-
cient search, negotiation or monitoring transaction resources.
Then we can determine what kind of legal role the court is be-
ing asked to play: mediation, arbitration, policing, or all three.
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*A full rational-choice theory of contract law will demonstrate
how different cases can be analyzed as falling into all three cat-
egories and the conditions under which rational default rules
will call for intervention by courts. (5) The rationality of legal
rules, from the point of view of this theory, will not depend on
their abstract rationality or efficiency, but on their rationality in
the context in which they are to apply.
To this point we have identified the phases of contracting;
three associated conditions of rationality that must be satisfied
if contracting is to be rational; three related problems rational
actors may face in securing a rational contract; the safe-
guards-endogenous and exogenous-available to protect
against contract failure; and the factors that affect the nature
and scope of the transaction cost problem. If we are correct,
many cases or doctrines in contract law can be assessed as ra-
tional responses to problems of coordination, division and de-
f&tion, corresponding to the three axes defining the
transaction resource space. Our long range ambition is to
demonstrate the power of the theory in each of these areas
where courts have been asked to serve the function of provid-
ing exogenous resources.
In this essay, having set forth the general theory for the first
time, we attempt a more modest illustration of its relevance.
Thus, we take up the role a court might be asked to play in
solving coordination problems by playing what we have called a
mediating role. In doing so, we analyze in detail a famous case
in contract law, Laidlaw v. Organ,54 which in most other ac-
counts is seen primarily as a case creating a property right in
information unencumbered by a duty to disclose-a right
lauded by proponents of economic efficiency. Contrary to pre-
vailing wisdom, we argue that the court's decision is best un-
derstood as serving a coordination function. The decision
promotes efficiency, not because a property right in informa-
tion is efficient, but because the court's authoritative pro-
nouncement reduces uncertainty and provides salience. Thus,
we choose the disclosure issue as it arises in Laidlaw v. Organ to
illustrate both how our theory leads one to think about cases
and how it may lead to answers different from those suggested
by traditional economic analysis.
54. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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A. Coordination, Search, and Disclosure
Nothing could be more fundamental to the notion of a ra-
tional bargain than the behavioral presumption that decision
makers calculate the relative benefits and costs of alternative
contracts predicated upon available information. Because in-
formation is costly, it follows that decision makers invest in in-
formation to refine their expectations, or in other words, to
safeguard themselves. The efficiency of these investments in
mitigating risk is always a private and a social concern. It can
become a legal concern when one party knows or has reason to
know that another is in error about information material to the
calculation. When does a contracting party have a duty to dis-
close, failing which the other party will be excused from
performance?
According to Kronman,55 the nondisclosure doctrine the
courts have crafted encourages socially efficient contracting by
creating a property right in information. People may retain the
benefits of their efforts to secure information relevant to pro-
ductive exchange opportunities, except in circumstances in
which they would have come by the information without effort.
When they can come by the information without effort, a dis-
closure requirement would not reduce the incentive to produce
it, and so might not be inefficient. In cases of mistake and dis-
closure, this argument holds, the court has been called upon as
a third-party enforcement agent and it has done so in a way that
is at least consistent with the principle of economic efficiency.
Kronman is surely right about the incentives that this doc-
trine can give individuals to invest in information: "One effec-
tive way of insuring that an individual will benefit from the
possession of information (or anything else for that matter) is
to assign him a property right in the information itself-a right
or entitlement to invoke the coercive machinery of the state in
order to exclude others from its use and enjoyment. The bene-
fits of possession become secure only when the state trans-
forms the possessor of information into an owner by investing
him with a legally enforceable property right of some sort or
other."56
The more secure the right to information, the more an indi-
55. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 1I J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1978).
56. Id at 14.
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vidual will be inclined to invest in producing it. The social as
opposed to the individual benefits of such a property right, how-
ever, are not as obvious, nor is the distinction between infor-
mation that results from deliberate search and that which has
been casually acquired necessarily decisive in establishing the
economic efficiency of the appropriate legal doctrine.
To see where Kronman's argument goes awry, consider the
case that is central to his analysis: Laidlaw v. Organ. Kronman's
recitation of the pertinent facts is illuminating. Organ, a New
Orleans commission merchant, had been bargaining with Fran-
cis Girault of Laidlaw & Co., also commission merchants, to
purchase 111 hogsheads of tobacco. Early in the morning of
February 19, 1815, Organ received news that the Treaty of
Ghent had been signed, formally ending the War of 1812. Or-
gan obtained the news from a Mr. Shepard, who had a financial
interest in the transaction with Laidlaw and whose brother was
one of three gentlemen who brought the news from the British
fleet. Before 8 A.M., when the news would be made public in a
handbill, Organ called on Girault to consummate the purchase.
Girault asked "if there was any news which was calculated to
enhance the price or value of the article about to be
purchased"; the record is not clear on Organ's response other
than Laidlaw's attorney alleging "the vendee was silent." Nev-
ertheless Girault and Organ entered into a contract.
The price of tobacco quickly rose by thirty to fifty percent as
news of the treaty circulated, signalling an end to the naval
blockade of New Orleans and the resumption of exporting.
Kronman reports that Laidlaw retained possssion of the to-
bacco, but the court record indicates that he first transferred it
to Organ, then recaptured it by force. In any case, Organ then
brought suit for damages and to block Laidlaw from otherwise
disposing of the tobacco. The trial judge evidently directed a
verdict in Organ's favor, deciding from the testimony that no
fraud occurred. On appeal before the Supreme Court,
Laidlaw's attorney argued, among other points, that fraud was
a matter for the jury to decide.
The Court agreed, reversed the judgment, and remanded
with directions for a new trial. Other than noting that Organ's
silence may have been fraudulent, Kronman puts aside ques-
tions of fraud. He focuses on the dictum rather than the holding
in the Court's opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Marshall.
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Generally regarded as an accurate statement of the law, it reads
as follows:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of
extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of
the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowl-
edge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by
him to the vendor? The court is of opinion that he was not
bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circum-
scribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the
means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.
But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or
do anything tending to impose upon the other.57
The attractiveness and subsequent longevity of Marshall's
opinion derives, in Kronman's view, from its consistency with
the principles of economic efficiency. It gives contracting par-
ties incentives to get valuable information to the market as
quickly as efficient investment in producing knowledge permits.
Indeed, "[t]he greater the likelihood that... information will
be deliberately produced [acquired at a cost that would not
have been incurred but for the likelihood that the information
in question would actually be produced,] rather than casually
discovered [by chance], the more plausible the assumption be-
comes that a blanket rule permitting nondisclosure will have
benefits that outweigh its costs."58 In addition, the administra-
tive costs facing the courts in crafting exceptions are lower
compared to the costs of imposing limits on a blanket rule cre-
ating a duty to disclose. In sum, a rule of nondisclosure is pro-
ductively efficient, and a rule of disclosure is too costly to
administer.
It is not obvious, however, that a property right in informa-
tion is productively efficient. Moreover, what is relevant in de-
termining the efficiency of the rule is not the manner in which
the information is obtained (casually or deliberately), but its in-
centive effects (productive or redistributive). Consider, in this
regard, an argument by the economist Hirshleifer.59 Central to
Hirshleifer's account is the distinction between foreknowl-
edge-predicting events that nature will autonomously make
known to all-from discovery-recognizing something that
57. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) at 195.
58. Kronman, supra note 55, at 18.
59. Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward io Inventive
Activity, 61 AM. EcON. REv. 561 (1977).
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possibly already exists, though hidden from view until human
action extracts it. Information of either sort has value only if it
can affect action. From an individual's perspective, the value of
new information and hence of investing in generating it, de-
rives from technology, gains from allocating resources more effi-
ciently, and distribution, wealth transfers that follow from price
changes. In the case of technology, information makes the
"pie" larger and thus increases ex ante each person's potential
share. In the case of distribution, information does not increase
the pie's size, only the shares of those who have the relevant
information..
From society's perspective, the consequences of technologi-
cal information are largely salutary, while those of redistribu-
tive information are not. As Hirshleifer puts it, "The
distributive advantage of private information provides an in-
centive for information generating activity that may quite possi-
bly be in excess of the social value of the information. '"60 The
argument is this: all information has a technological as well as a
redistributive dimension. In many cases, investment in infor-
mation will be socially efficient because the technological gains
will outweigh the costs of investment, However, in some cases,
the technological effects will be less significant than the redis-
tributive ones. In these cases, private investment can exceed
social return.
Consider two cases. In one case, Jones and Smith each invest
$1 to gather information, the technological effect of which is
$10, while the redistributive effect is $1.50. Two dollars are
spent to secure $10; $1.50 goes to the discoverer, say Jones,
with the net gain of $8 shared among the group (including
Jones). In the other case, Jones and Smith again invest $1 to
uncover information whose social value is only $.25, but whose
redistributive value is $1.50. Jones and Smith each act ration-
ally, spending $1 to seek $1.50, but the net effect is inefficient.
Two dollars are spent to create $.25. Thus, giving individuals
the full benefit of the information they obtain may lead them to
act in socially inefficient ways whenever the redistributive as-
pect of information dominates its technological dimension.
Kronman recognizes that a rule in favor of nondisclosure can
create perverse incentives and, therefore, that the decision to
60. L at 570.
694 [Vol. 12
HeinOnline  -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  694 1989
Bargaining Theoiy
permit nondisclosure of certain information forces a practical
choice between over- and underinvestment. His considered
judgment is that because it is "certain" that eliminating prop-
erty rights will result in underproduction, and "merely a dan-
ger" that recognizing them will result in overproduction, the
economic case for recognizing them is strong ("but not conclu-
sive"), especially when information is deliberately acquired.6'
Neither alternative is optimal, he. notes, but assuming legal
rules cannot be more finely tuned, the latter one is better.
Though Kionman relies upon considerations of the sort
Hirshleifer summons, his conclusion-that a property right to
information that does not require disclosure is, on balance, effi-
cient-is, if Hirshleifer is right, unwarranted. As Hirshleifer
sees it, the incentives to secure a distributive advantage "elimi-
nate any a priori anticipation of underinvestment in the genera-
tion of new technological knowledge." 2 That is, investment in
information that is likely to be primarily redistributive with lit-
tle apparent gain in efficiency may be so great under a rule of
nondisclosure that the costs of such a rule in terms of ineffi-
cient rent-seeking behavior may outweigh its benefits in terms
of the production of net social gains. Thus, Kronman ought not
confidently claim, as he does, that "allocative efficiency is best
served by permitting one who possesses deliberately acquired
information to enter and enforce favorable bargains without
disclosing what he knows." 68 Whether the social gains created
by a property right in information unencumbered by a require-
ment of disclosure will outweigh the social costs of investment
depends on the relative effect-technological or redistribu-
tive-of the information.
Kronman's argument can be read as supporting a property
right in information unencumbered by a disdosure'rule on the
grounds that any more finely-tuned rule will be too costly to
administer. Administrative, rather than allocative, efficiency be-
comes the core of the argument. In order to create an adequate
incentive to invest in information, a legal right to the informa-
tion must be created, and the shape of that right, whether it
requires disclosure or not, depends on considerations of ad-
61. Kronman, supra note 55, at 17 n.46.
62. Hirshleifer, supra note 59, at 575.
63. Kronman, supra note 55, at 17.
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ministrative cost avoidance. The latter point is emphasized by
Chief Justice Marshall.
The foregoing argument rests on three assumptions: first, of
course, that a legal property right in information unencum-
bered by a disclosure rule is necessary to secure the benefits of
information; second, that such an approach produces benefits
in excess of costs; and third, that the property rule in informa-
tion cannot cost-effectively be more finely-tuned. The truth of
none of these assumptions is obvious. First,. creating a legally
enforceable right is not the only means to security. Indeed, peo-
ple may be able to make the benefits of possession relatively
more secure by resorting first to their endogenous transaction
resources rather than depending upon legal rules. That was
our point much emphasized in Part IV, and, as we shall show,
Laidlaw in particular was a case in which the parties, commis-
sion merchants dealing in a competitive commodities market,
were particularly well-suited to secure the gains from informa-
tion in the absence of legal safeguards. Property rights were
neither necessary nor rational. Second, given the risks of third-
party intervention we identified in Part IV, action by the state
cannot be assumed to secure benefits in excess of costs. Finally,
while circumscribing a duty to disclose might be difficult, as
Chief Justice Marshall opined, we cannot a priori rule out its
feasibility in all circumstances."r
Even if Kronman's analysis of the problem in terms of the
efficiency of a rule of nondisclosure is unpersuasive, he cor-
rectly sees the general problem: if the parties to a contract fail
to allocate risks and turn to the court for remedy, what default
rule makes sense? The answer depends on the risks that will be
of concern to rational actors. Kronman takes it that rational ac-
tors are primarily concerned with what Hirshleifer called tech-
nological risks; in allocating the risk of a mistake, for example,
64. See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195. Chamberlin and Scheppele argue that
Kronman's approach is wrong because the risk is deeply strategic, a risk that secrets
may be employed to influence the actions or feelings of others. The question before
the court is how to allocate knowledge between two parties given that one party has it
already; the answer turns on the advantage people may be allowed to take of each
other. This is something of a distributive risk rather than one of allocative efficiency.
Chamberlin and Scheppele effect a Rawlsian solution, analyzing the legal rules as the
product of a hypothetical agreement reached among rational actors in advance of
knowing whether one or another will be in possession of a deep or shallow secret. SeJ.
Chamberlin & K. Scheppele, Fairness and Symmetry in Information Games, Paper
Presented at the Meetings of the American Political Science Association (Aug. 1986).
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a nondisclosure rule imposes that risk on the mistaken party.
The question before the Court in applying that default rule is
whether the information required to avoid the mistake is more
likely to be generated by chance or by deliberate searching. But
what of the redistributive risk that Hirshleifer identified, that is,
the risk that private information can be used for redistributive
ends? In Laidlaw, do technological or redistributive risks
dominate?
In bargaining theoretic terms, the default rule embraces both
risks: the rule minimize the sum of the costs of uncertainty and
of its avoidance. The question before the court is who is in the
best position to accomplish that? In some contexts, in which
the risks are primarily technological, the court should act in ac-
cord with Kronman's formulation of the default rule. When
other risks, especially distributive ones, predominate, focusing
on whether the information to be disclosed is more likely to be
revealed by chance or by deliberate search will not be an ap-
propriate test. In sum, Kronman may be right that the rule is
efficient, but for the wrong reasons. Thus, his formula for ap-
plying the default rule is misguided.
Examining more closely the context, as well as the holding,
in Laidlaw v. Organ provides a good illustration of a more rigor-
ous formula consistent with the theory outlined in Sections II
through IV. First, the end of the naval blockade, like a drought
or a blight, describes a state of nature inevitably to be revealed
to the public; information about them is less technological than
distributive. So this is not the sort of case that, on either
Kronman's or Hirshleifer's account, suggests a nondisclosure
rule.
Second, the context reveals a network of pre-existing con-
tractual agreements within which the dispute arose. That sheds
light on the demand for third-party intervention and sets the
stage for ChiefJustice Marshall's dictum. The case concerned a
contract for a commodity. Conditions in commodity markets
represent a close real-world approximation to those found in a
theoretical model of a pure exchange economy. Goods are ex-
changed on the spot, so contracts are well defined in time,
place, and purpose. Allowing for readily observable differences
in grades, tobacco is a relatively homogeneous and divisible
good. Although merchants in a given city who specialize in one
commodity might be a relatively small fraternity of members
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who come to know each other over time, they tend to be suffi-
ciently numerous-or potentially so with relatively low entry
costs-so no one sets prices. So long as many exchanges occur,
the primary safeguard afforded a tobacco merchant lies in the
alternative merchants waiting to deal.
If tobacco merchants buy on their own accounts, as did Or-
gan and Laidlaw, they take on an economic function more than
that of sales agents. Commission merchants facilitate market
exchange in two ways, both characterized by specializing in
search activities. First, they collect a transaction fee for bringing
buyers and sellers together, narrowing the spread between
price bid and price asked. Second, they speculate on extrinsic
circumstances, as Chief Justice Marshall phrased it, hedging
their exposure to risk by adjusting their inventories. Given the
uncertainties, varying initial conditions, and costs of exchange
faced by their principals, commission merchants become "mar-
ket makers," specialists who increase the liquidity and reduce
the costs of participating in the commodity trade.65
We might expect these merchants to have ample endogenous
resources for private contracting. Long before Laidlaw v. Organ,
they invested in information, making deals and allowing produ-
cers to specialize in production. They need no third party to
mediate; indeed, the merchants are mediators. Moreover, these
merchants regularly negotiate over quantity, quality, and price.
The risks of unfair divisions are mitigated by transforming the
decisions into a sequence solvable within the constraints of
available bargaining resources held by private parties. As a con-
sequence these merchants do not normally need a third party
to arbitrate. Finally, alternative exchange opportunities and rep-
utation effects typically mitigate defection incentives without
unduly straining enforcement resources. Thus, the merchants
need not risk creating a third-party enforcer, except to deal with
those categories of defections that are unusually costly to
safeguard.
In short, given the theory presented here in which the princi-
pal parties are viewed as rational actors embeded in particular
65. "[S]peculation in grain, for example by setting aside a certain class of persons to
assume the risks of trade, has the effect of reducing these risks by putting them in the
hands of those who have most knowledge, for, as we have seen, risk varies inversely
with knowledge." I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 221 (1930); see also S. KHOURY,
SPECULATIVE MARitxrs 169-70 (1984); Williams, Futures Markets: A Consequence of Risk
Aversion or Transaction Costs, 95J. PoL. EcON. 1000 (1987).
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contexts, it would appear to follow that neither Laidlow nor
Organ had sufficient reason to seek any form of third-party in-
tervention. The context, which is so important to our analysis,
is one that suggests that the parties in this case possessed easy
access to ample endogenous transaction resources.
Two aspects of the case need to be explained. The first is the
holding in the case; the second is the dicta. To explain the
Supreme Court's holding in the case, we need first to under-
stand how the case came to court, and the question of law the
Court was asked to resolve. Recall that we distinguish among
three sorts of risks parties will seek to safeguard against, first by
deploying endogenous transaction resources, and then by pur-
suing third-party intervention in the event their resources are
inadequate to the task. These are risks of failed coordination,
division and defectiori. When courts are sought to safeguard,
we say that they play mediation, arbitration or enforcement
roles respectively.
The case comes to court framed as a defection problem in
which the principal parties are requesting the court to play an
enforcement or policing role. Organ brought the case to court
claiming Laidlaw's breach. Laidlaw's defense to the charge of
breach rested on Organ's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation
of the facts. For his part, Organ sued for possession of the to-
bacco and for his damages, in effect seeking to employ the
power of the state to enforce the contract and, thereby, to pun-
ish Laidlaw's breach. The trial judge refused to submit the
question of fraud to the jury. The jury refused to award dam-
ages, preferring instead to award possession of the tobacco. To
be sure, Laidlaw's counsel raised the division problem on ap-
peal: "Though [Laidlaw], after they heard the news of peace,
still went on, in ignorance of their legal rights, to complete the
contract, equity will protect them." 66
Because the issue as presented on appeal was that of fraud,
the Supreme Court could not avoid addressing the question of
defection. It agreed with Laidlaw that the trial judge erred in
refusing to submit the question of fraud to the jury and accord-
ingly remanded for a new trial. On the other hand the court did
not allow itself to be dragged into protecting against unfair di-
visions under precisely the conditions where the parties could
66. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) at 190.
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safeguard privately at much lower transaction cost. Division
problems are more cheaply solved in a competitive market, as
was the context here, than in a court. That accounts in part for
ChiefJustice Marshall's concern about the administrative costs
of judicial intervention: "It would be difficult to circumscribe
the contrary doctrine [disclosure] within proper limits, where
the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both
parties. ' 6
7
Following Kronman's lead, economic analysis ignores the
Court's holding, focusing entirely on Chief Justice Marshall's
dictum. Our analysis offers a plausible reconstruction of both.
Part III shows that safeguarding against defection is the most
information-intensive of the three dimensions in rational con-
tracting. The calculus of safeguarding against breach is the
most complex. The probability of mistake is greatest and, ac-
cordingly, so are the costs of guarding against it.
To see this, consider the difference between errors made in
safeguarding divisions and those made in safeguarding against
potential defections. If the principals or a court errs in safe-
guarding against unfair division, the error simply moves the
parties from one point along the contract curve to another. The
parties remain on the contract curve and, therefore, are better
off than both would have been had no contract been made.
In contrast, a mistake in discerning or correcting for an al-
leged breach can make either party worse off than he would
have been in the absence of agreement. Mistakenly determin-
ing that no breach has occurred enforces the breaching party's
nonperformance payoff. That necessarily makes the other party
worse off than he was at the point of no agreement, that is, the
status quo. On the other hand, because the force of agreement
is aimed at displacing the defection payoff towards the point of
no agreement, imposing a penalty when no breach has oc-
curred forces both parties off the contract curve.
Further, when a court as third party determines that a breach
has occurred, it sends a message of potential unreliability to
other potential cooperators. It thus chills cooperative endeav-
ors. It reminds the parties of the need to expend transaction
resources to reduce the probability of nonperformance, and it
reminds everyone that sometimes even the optimal expendi-
67. Id at 195.
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ture of resources will not foreclose entirely the chance of being
victimized by one's partners.
Given this, it is that much more important that courts reduce
the probability of error. Court decisions regarding divisions of
the gains from trade have no comparable effects on markets. In
this sense, mutual trust is more important than is fairness to a
scheme of cooperation by contract. In sum, the greatest
probability and cost of making a mistake in rational contracting
occur in discerning or protecting against defection.
As betweena judge and a jury, the jury is better positioned
to determine whether a fraudulent "imposition was practiced,"
that is, whether a defection occured. The reason is rather
straight-forward. A finding of fraud typically turns heavily on
findings of fact, such as the prevailing practices in the business
community (because that delimits what each party can be as-
sumed to have known) and who communicated what, to whom
and when. For accuracy, reliability, and community representa-
tion in fact finding, a multi-member decision-making body op-
erating under unanimity rule is preferable to a single decision
maker, perhaps even an experienced one.6" Given that the
principal parties could no longer resolve the issue privately, re-
manding for a new jury trial places discretion where the sum of
the costs of uncertainty and of safeguarding against it are likely
to be least. Thus, our theory provides an extremely plausible
account of the case's holding. Now to Chief Justice Marshall's
famous dictum.
One supposes that part of what makes commodities markets
valuable is their ability to process information-even informa-
tion about extraordinary events-without recourse to either vi-
olent or legal action. However extraordinary an event the
signing of a treaty is, it is not more so than is a blight or
drought, all of which create opportunities for merchants to use
for their personal benefit information not yet available to
others.
After having turned over the tobacco, on the day following
circulation of the handbill announcing the Treaty, Laidlaw, "by
force" retook possession of the tobacco and withheld it from
Organ. That action, should it prevail as a practice, would
68. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD, & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Kaye, And
Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court. and the Size of the Jury, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 1004 (1980).
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threaten the network of communication channels that makes
possible market exchange, the specialized normative infrastruc-
ture that permits commission merchants to extract payment for
their services. The decision to seek to sequester only highlights
the extent of the risk, for doing so put at risk whatever gains
had been captured by the initial contractual scheme of
cooperation.69
Think of the problem this way: Laidlaw and Organ are poten-
tial cooperators. They disagree about whether individuals who
have private information affecting prices should make full dis-
closure to their contracting partners. That they disagree about
disclosure may be unknown to both of them, and in the bulk of
the transactions between them their disagreement has no im-
pact. In the circumstances presented by the facts of the case,
however, the difference of opinion obviously makes a differ-
ence. The important difference between the parties, however,
is not that one of them is right from either a moral or an eco-
nomic point of view about the duty to disclose. Rather, what is
important is the existence of a difference, period. The existence
of a difference makes coordination difficult. Bargaining is al-
ways easier when property rights are well defined, and it is
most difficult when genuine disagreement about them exists.
This disagreement about the norm regarding disclosure or
its applicability in the circumstances surrounding the sale is
played out in Laidlaw's recapture of the tobacco (or his failing
to deliver it-depending on one's reading of the record). This
action ultimately invites the Supreme Court to provide an au-
thoritative pronouncement regarding disclosure or misrepre-
sentation. In doing so the Court will play a mediating role,
specifying authoritatively the norms governing market transac-
tions, thereby reducing the risks and costs of cooperation. To
69. Although two parties always invest in crafting contractual safeguards when allo-
cating risk, it is particularly difficult to craft a force ofagreement that will ensure com-
pliance when, as here, the contract entails the small risk of a large loss. Laidlaw lost big,
The facts ex post created a circumstance in which reclaiming the tobacco made sense
even accounting for possible legal action by Organ and approbation from the commu-
nity. Whatever privately enforced norms existed among commodity brokers in New
Orleans, Laidlaw, who appeared to be performing in accord with the contract long
after news of the Treaty circulated, no doubt had to confront his client, a New York
merchant who might not have had a stake in those norms. Indeed, whether in the ab-
sence of legal action reputation effects would have ultimately punished Laidlaw or Or-
gan for violating a norm could well have been unclear. Given the immediate stakes,
each party had ample incentive to seek authoritative affirmation of his view.
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see this, we should consider both the context of the case and
the longevity of the Court's dictum.
We can distinguish between the coordination and welfare ef-
fects of a rule. In circumstances of the sort commission
merchants faced, any authoritative rule would have solved their
coordination problem. This was, as we noted, a highly competi-
tive market in which the principal parties were repeat players.
What Laidlaw and Organ needed was an authoritative charac-
terization of the rule-whatever its content. In that sense,
either ruling on disclosure would have sufficed. Thus, from a
coordination point of view, the rule expressed in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion has no special efficacy with respect to peo-
ple investing efficiently in information. Once the rule is in
place, negotiations between the parties are easier because the
threat of noncoordination is reduced.
If it happens that all negotiating parties discover that they
could do better under the alternative rule, then the rule the
court announces will be unstable. No party will diverge from it
unilaterally but all may be inclined to do so jointly. In the case
under discussion, as we already noted, the private information
concerned price changes and was fundamentally distributive, not
productive, in its impact. Thus, there is no reason to think that
a norm requiring disclosure would be any less efficient from a
welfare point of view than would the rule the court actually ad-
vanced. So in the instant case and in competitive or repeat play
circumstances generally, either ruling would be efficient in
both the coordination and welfare sense.
The point of the Court's opinion, then, is to facilitate com-
munication by providing salience in the form of a nearly arbi-
trary choice. With respect to all other matters relating to
coordination, the Court put the burden of deciding how much'
to expend on safeguarding squarely on the shoulders of those
in the best position to exercise that judgment-the principal
parties. That is just as it should be. As Michael Taylor has ar-
gued in other contexts, by serving an authoritative coordina-
tion role unnecessarily, the state decreases the incentives for
parties to devise creative solutions of their own. 7" By substitut-
ing legal pronouncements for endogenously devised ones, the
state weakens the bonds of community, or, in this case, weak-
70. See M. TAYLOR, ANARcHY, CoMMuNrrY AND LIBERTY (1982).
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ens the market structure. In short, however disinclined they
may become to rely upon or to exhaust their transaction re-
sources in favor of a third-party solution, when the principal
parties remain in the best position to contract efficiently, courts
should place the burdens of safeguarding on them. That is pre-
cisely what this case does.
We say that the Court's choice of a rule that does not require
disclosure is nearly, but not fully arbitrary, for the following rea-
son. Sometimes principal parties will lack endogenous transac-
tion resources sufficient to resolve all conflicts on the terms of
cooperation. Perhaps the market in which they transact is inad-
equately competitive and therefore too few alternatives exist;
or the players are contracting on a one-time basis, in which
reputational effects are minimized. In these circumstances the
parties may rationally call upon the court to mediate. In that
event, the rule that does not impose a duty to disclose may be
easier to administer than likely alternatives to it. Moreover, if
the Court retained discretion to allocate the search and distrib-
utive risks involved here, it might incur high direct costs as well
as frequently abuse the notions of fair division held by private
parties and communities, thereby calling into question the le-
gitimacy of its value as a third-party intervenor.
This is a case about coordination and mediation. As such,
either legal rule would have sufficed. Moreover, from the point
of view of wealth or welfare maximization, the circumstances of
this case provide no argument for nondisclosure as a default
rule ex ante. In short, the choice of the nondisclosure rule rests
ultimately on considerations of administrative efficiency.
To sum up, Kronman, like much of the law and economics
literature that follows his article, reads Laidlaw as creating a
property right in information, one that can be squared with effi-
ciency. We have argued first that a property right in informa-
tion may not be generally efficient, and second that a more
compelling characterization of Laidlaw, one that follows from
the theory developed here, sees it primarily as a court resolving
a coordination problem by providing salience via authoritative
ruling. A court thus mediates rather than arbitrates or polices
and, in that way, protects against the transaction-resource fron-
tier shrinking.
Though our analysis of Laidlaw is at odds with traditional
economic analysis, there are bound to be many areas of over-
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lap. After all, nothing we have said diminishes the incentives
associated with protecting the right of one party to realize the
gains associated from specialized investments in information.
However, it may not be necessary or appropriate to reach the
distinction emphasized by Kronman between casual and delib-
erately acquired information in order to explain the case law. A
more plausible explanation, we believe, has the Court distin-
guishing among the relative efficacy of alternative safeguards-
including judicial intervention-given the risks of contract fail-
ure involved, and placing responsibility and discretion with the
party or parties who are in the best position to safeguard. Per-
haps we can further illustrate the force of our theory by com-
paring the analysis of other cases it suggests with the analysis
Kronman offers.
Two lines of cases -Kronman explores involve real estate,
either the existence of subsurface oil or mineral deposits
known by the buyer but not the seller, or the anticipation of a
development of some sort that will make the property in ques-
tion more valuable.71 In both cases we have speculative, com-
modity-like markets. Courts would avoid intervening without
more compelling reason because the disputants are the most
efficient allocators of the risks.72
The third line of cases involves distinguishing patent from
latent defects. The logic of the standard economic argument
merits attention. Suppose the seller can come by the informa-
tion about a defect without deliberate investigation. If the argu-
71. In the case of Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. 263, 27 A. 992 (1893), a cotenant on an
oil lease, Shamburg, discovered a particularly valuable well in the course of developing
an adjacent parcel. He did not disclose this when he purchased the interst of his
cotentant, Neill. The court rejected Neil's request to set aside the sale. Curiously,
Shamburg's information might have been casually acquired in the sense Kronman
means; Shamburg was incurring costs to develop the adjacent parcel for oil production
anyway.
72. Kronman notes that the courts find a compelling reason in many of these cases
because the problem involves breach of a confidential or fiduciary relation between
parties to the contract. In these instances, failure to disclose is constructively fraudu-
lent-defection. In other instances, the problem involves discriminating between non-
disclosure and positive misrepresentation (fraud). Because these cases center on
difficult questions of fact "about which it is difficult to generalize in a way that is theo-
retically interesting," he elects not to discuss these problems. See Kronman, supra note
55, at 19. From the perspective of bargaining and transaction costs, interesting gener-
alizations become possible. We should be able to discriminate among these sorts of
relationships, that is, guardian and ward, partner and copartners, principal and agent,
where market safeguards will be less readily available to mitigate heightened risks, es-
pecially ex post risks of defection. In addition, discriminating who is in the best posi-
tion to ascertain facts and act efficiently with respect to them should prove more
tractable than ascertaining the facts themselves.
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ment against a disclosure rule applies to information available
only through investment in discovery, why do the courts not
impose a duty to disclose on the seller as the party able to avoid
a mistake at least cost? In fact, the court imposes no such duty.
Kronman resolves the inconsistency by saying the "rule that a
seller of real property has no duty to disclose patent defects
makes economic sense where-as is often the case-the seller
has no reason to know that the buyer is mistaken."3
Kronman's resolution does not reach the question whether the
seller would come by the information through deliberate inves-
tigation for defects, and therefore does not invoke the distinc-
tion between casual and deliberate means of obtaining
information. Rather, his solution invokes considerations much
more amenable to our analysis, for it turns on the question of
who should allocate risk when information is public and, hence,
has no economic value; that is, information as a safeguard is
cheap. And markets provide the most efficient safeguards when
no party need invest heavily in information about other parties'
knowledge (doing that makes more sense in contexts where the
division or defection incentives are particularly high and alter-
native safeguards are few). So the issue Kronman finds decisive
is the same one we find decisive. A court would not intervene
so long as market safeguards are available.
On the other hand, courts tend to impose a duty to disclose
latent defects in products, such as termites in a house for sale.
As Kronman says, a disclosure requirement would not be likely
to reduce the production of such information.7 4 But distin-
guishing on this score between information about attributes of
goods held for sale, as in this case, and information about mar-
kets such as demand or supply shifts, as in Laidlaw, is not so
helpful. For example, availability of product and support serv-
ices may be attributes affecting price. Most importantly, with
latent defects the distributive risks overwhelm the technologi-
cal risks; ex post costs of remedy for unfair divisions are high, if
contractual remedy exists at all.
A reputation for fair dealing helps, but in a fragmented in-
dustry such as housing, especially existing housing, reputation
is a scarce commodity. Perhaps one motivation for state courts
permitting nondisclosure about termites through the mid
73. Id at 23.
74. See id at 25.
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1950s and requiring disclosure more frequently thereafter was
an explosion in owner-occupied housing likely to generate nu-
merous occasions of defection by failing to disclose latent de-
fects. Indeed, only recently have real estate brokers begun to
offer inspection services and guarantees (sometimes because
mortgagors require it), in effect acting as a centralized bonding
agency.
B. The Default Rule Revisited
We close with a brief reconsideration of the default rule. The
most powerful implication of our analysis of rational bargain-
ing for contract law concerns the legitimacy of applying the so-
called default rule. Courts are often required to fill in the
blanks of incomplete contracts by answering the question of
what the parties would have agreed to ex ante. Hopefully, one
thing we have made perfectly clear is that answering that ques-
tion is no trivial undertaking-even under the best of
circumstances.
Economists of law cite the "ex ante contract" as part of the
argument for applying an efficiency interpretation of contract
doctrine. Their reason for doing so is clear. The ex ante con-
tract is to be modeled as a'rational bargain between the parties
and Pareto optimality (joint rationality) is a condition of ra-
tional bargaining. Indeed it is.
But so are the conditions of individual and concession ra-
tionality. And in all cases, satisfying the demands of rationality
in a contract are considerably more complex than the hand-
waving response of the legal economist-namely, to find an al-
location of rights and responsibilities that is jointly wealth max-
imizing-would suggest. In fact, any number of distributions of
rights and responsibilities between the parties would be jointly
profit maximizing. These distributions differ from one another
in how they divide the gains from contracting. Thus, to impose
any jointly maximizing allocation of rights and responsibilities
is incompatible with the lessons of the rational bargaining
model developed here. For rational bargainers are as con-
cerned with problems of rational division as they are with joint
rationality. It is, therefore, as inappropriate for courts to im-
pose jointly maximizing outcomes on them in the name of effi-
ciency without regard to concession rationality as it would be to
impose a distribution of rights and responsibilities that satisfies
707No. 3]
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the concession rationality condition without regard to whether
that distribution is jointly rational (or profit maximizing).
More importantly, empty appeals to abstract efficiency orjus-
tice ignore the importance of context to rational contractors.
What rational parties are prepared ex ante to leave for a court
to resolve depends on the transaction resources available en-
dogenously. Attending to those factors enables us to see
Laidlaw as a case in which the court is being asked to solve a
coordination problem by providing an authoritative statement
of the norm regarding disclosure. Failing to attend to specific
contextual features of disputes in the name of reconstruction in
the light of the abstract norms of efficiency and justice makes a
mockery of the idea of the ex ante contract as a default rule.
For in abstracting from the context, a court is disabled from
asking "What would these parties have agreed to ex ante?" and
asks instead "What would be efficient or just from a global
point of view?" We have no doubt that it is an interesting ques-
tion to ask what is either just or efficient, but it is simply not the
question the ex ante contract as a default rule necessarily
asks.75
75. The approach we are developing here takes seriously the idea that in filling out
incomplete contracts, courts ought to impose on the parties ex post that to which they
would have agreed to ex ante. To do that, courts must reconstruct a hypothetical ra-
tional bargain between (or among) the parties. What rational individuals in fact agree
to under certain conditions need be neither fair nor efficient. Thus, that to which they
would have agreed under those conditions may also be neither fair nor efficient. Do we
really mean to suggest that courts should impose a division of rights, responsibilities
and risks that merely transmits inequities in the parties' relative bargaining positions,
thereby exacerbating, rather than alleviating, whatever injustices between them already
exist?
This is a difficult question. Our tentative answer is a qualified "yes." One central
aspect of the rational bargaining approach is the importance of conserving transaction
resources. To see this, imagine any default rule that sought to rectify pre-existing ine-
qualities by imposing rights and responsibilities ex post in a way that nullified or mini-
mized pre-existing advantages. Because any default rule would be in effect only to the
extent that the parties did not contract around it, its net effect would be to encourage
as little reliance upon it as would be rational for the parties. In order to protect pre-
existing advantages, parties will simply seek more completely to specify their contracts,
thus reducing the rule's impact. By doing so, both parties will further deplete their
resources, reducing the extent to which those resources can be employed to reduce
uncertainty regarding other aspects of negotiations.
Secondly, we should draw a distinction between two concepts of fairness, one endog-
enous to the transactional framework, the other external to it. We would not want to
dispute the possibility of a standard ofjustice in distribution according to which both
pre-existing holding and entitlements that result from the contractual process can be
evaluated or criticized. By such a standard, it may well be that a default rule of the sort
we are discussing encourages rather than reduces unfairness. Notice, however, that the
default rule merely transmits the unfairness of the initial holdings. The unfairness, if
there is one, resides in the conditions that comprise the parties' relative bargaining
HeinOnline  -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  708 1989
No. 3] Bargaining Theory 709
Whatever one's theory of contractual obligation, whether
based on consent, promising or rationality, a minimum condi-
tion for justifiably applying the default rule is that it imposes
obligations on the parties-including the use of third-party in-
terveners-that reflects what would have been rational for
them in the circumstances of their contract. But on any such
account, to impose jointly rational outcomes without regard to
context is, at the least, to incompletely understand the default
rule, and, at worst, to encumber individuals by unjustifiably ex-
ercising the coercive authority of the state.76
positions. To rectify that probtem, we should want to preclude explicit agreements that
take advantage of those inequities, not just those that are imposed in the absence of
explicit agreement. There is, in other words, nothing especially objectionable about
the default rule itself. Moreover, it is a further question whether these sorts of inequali-
ties are best rectified by courts on a case-by-case basis.
Let us consider the concept of transactional fairness. Any default rule that sought to
annul ex post a pre-existing advantage would confer upon the advantaged party less
than he could have or would have secured by making the terms of the agreement ex-
plicit. In doing so, the rule may treat that party unfairly relative to his trading partners.
Not only would such a rule fail the test of rationality by encouraging the use of transac-
tion resources, thereby increasing uncertainty, it may treat the parties, at least from a
transactional point of view, unfairly.
76. To examine the role of the court when it is asked to solve division problems by
playing what we have called an arbitrating role, one could look to a line of cases and
scholarship associated with doctrines such as laesio enormis (under Roman law, a stan-
dard of equivalence in exchange that, despite its apparent rejection in modern" times,
arguably has been smuggled into current doctrines under other guises) or unconscio-
nability (a test evaluating one-sided clauses that oppress or unfairly surprise a party).
This examination would uncover the guidelines or principles of fairness that may be
covert, and should be overt, in common law; and it would assess these in view of the
theory of rational bargaining proposed here. See Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its
Limits, 95 HARV. L Rxv. 741 (1982); Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining
Power Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 TORoNTO L.J. 359 (1976).
To examine the role of the court when it is asked to solve defection problems by
playing what we have called an enforcing role, one could look at doctrines associated
with damage measures or specific performance. For example, the model of behavior
posited in the divisible prisoner's dilemma has parallels in the analysis of expectation,
reliance, and restitution measures in Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52 (1936); see also Bishop, The Choice of Remedyfor Breach of Contract,
14 J. LEa. STUD. 299 (1985); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and theJust
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L REv. 554 (1977); Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. Ri,. 967 1983); Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts:
Penalty Clauses and Spedfic Performance, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1981).
Extensions of the analysis could apply to statutory law as well, accounting for condi-
tions under whichjuducial intervention will tend to prove less satisfactory than legisla-
tive action. For example, in the context of administrative processes, see Heckathorn &
Maser, supra note 30. In the context of constitutional choice, see Heckathorn & Maser,
Bargaining and Constitutional Contracts, 31 AM. J. POL. Sci. 142 (1987).
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